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1 WHAT IS MILITARY DOCTRINE? 
It would be difficult to define the concept of military doctrine to 
the satisfaction of all readers. Its content and meaning vary from 
one country to another, and no two analysts define it in exactly 
the same way. This article examines how technological 
developments in weapons systems have influenced the military 
doctrines of three very different entities - superpowers, The 
Warsaw Pact and NATO alliances and neutral countries. In the 
absence of a common consensus, the concept of military doctrine 
is usually defined quite generally. For the purposes of this article, 
it is taken to mean those secret, declared or otherwise public or 
simply well-established strategic, operational and tactical policies 
that a state or an alliance employs in achieving its strategic goals. 
The most common such goal is to ensure the security of the 
nation and its citizens. 
The American analyst Barry R. Posen maintains that, in 
examining a state's military doctrine, one should look at how the 
tools for meeting political and military goals are chosen and 
used. The nature of the action will depend primarily on the 
perceived strength of the opponent. 
Military doctrines can be classified as offensive, defensive 
or deterrent in nature. The Blitzkrieg doctrine, developed by the 
Germans in the 1930s, is an example of an offensive policy directly 
related to power political aspirations.' Attempts to achieve 
widespread territorial hegemony through armed invasion are 
still being made in the Persian Gulf (e.g. Iraq) and the Middle-
East in general. If we exclude the invasion of Croatia by Serbian 
troops in 1991-92, such policy has largely been abandoned in 
Europe. Since the Second World War purely offensive doctrines 
have become rare on the strategic level. Operational plans for 
different theatres of operation and the employment of troops 
may still contain an offensive element, however. 
The idea of employing defensive military force to guarantee 
the security of a country or an alliance has become widely 
accepted. The Great Wall of China and the Maginot Line are 
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expressions of traditional defensive doctrines. Since World War 
II, such inflexible defensive models have, however, been replaced 
by models that call for a deeper, territorially more flexible use of 
forces. Almost inevitably, defensive policy assumes offensive 
(counter-offensive) features as well. The defence doctrines of 
neutral states and the mobile defence of some NATO troops in 
Germany express this tendency.' 
In recent decades, the idea of deterring an opponent from 
attacking out of fear that his losses would be unacceptably high 
has become the main basis for strategic doctrines. Military power 
is developed and maintained in order to prevent wars. Absolute 
deterrence refers to the ability of a country or an alliance to carry 
out a retaliative strike that the aggressor cannot withstand. The 
Soviet and U.S. doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons 
were both predicated on this principle of absolute deterrence. 
Countries with only limited military resources attempt to stay 
out of conflicts by maintaining a policy of relative deterrence. 
Europe's neutral states have adopted this policy. The idea is to 
be able to inflict on the aggressor unacceptable damage, so that it 
is more advantageous for it not to engage the defender. A strategic 
doctrine based on deterrence can, operationally or tactically, be 
either offensive or defensive. 
There are various levels of doctrines. Those that concern the 
employment of the entire military capability of a country or an 
alliance can be labelled strategic. In the post World War II period 
the strategic doctrines of the superpowers have been based on 
nuclear deterrence. Strategic defence policies of neutral states 
usually rely on the ability of conventional forces to act as a 
deterrent, whereby an adequate attack threshold is maintained. 
Doctrines at operational and tactical levels indicate how 
warfare should be waged to meet the various goals of strategy. 
These battle doctrines describe the actions of corps, divisions 
and smaller units, the types of operations to be conducted, the 
kinds of troops to be employed and in what manner. 
The Swedish researcher Wilhelm Agrell classifies doctrines 
into three categories: secret, declared or otherwise public, and 
ones that have become established through common practice .3  
Although the classification originates from a study describing 
the Swedish defence policy, it appears to hold more generally as 
well. 
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Secret doctrines embody the real principles for the use of 
force in a time of crisis. Mobilization and operational plans are 
almost always secret. 
Public doctrines describe those aspects of a state's or an 
alliance's behaviour in crisis that are not perceived to jeopardize 
its security. Public doctrines often provide the basis for the state's 
deterrence policy. The usual purpose of a declared doctrine is to 
emphasize the intention of the author. Austrian's announcement 
of neutrality, or that of any other neutral country, stating that it 
will not allow its territory to be used against third parties, can be 
classified as a declared doctrine. 
Sometimes a false yet feasible policy is declared in order to 
conceal real policy and mislead the opponent. Small states can 
only do this at an operations and tactical level, but the 
superpowers, with their enormous resources, are able to exercise 
this option at the strategic level as well. 
A common practice may evolve into official policy, as when 
war experiences shape the policies of nation states. It can be 
assumed, for example, that the experiences of the United States 
in the Gulf War will reinforce certain aspects of its policy. Thus, 
the practice of setting up an information pool in times of crisis is 
expected to become official U.S. policy. Likewise changes in 
arms production projects will have an impact on policies 
regarding the use of force. 
Doctrines become public knowledge in different ways. Secret 
doctrines may leak out through negotiations, careless comments 
or intelligence gathering. Declared policies are often disclosed in 
speeches or documents that are published solely for this purpose. 
Typically these describe the author's assessments of the world 
situation, perceived threats, and how to respond to the challenges 
in a way that promotes national interests. Public sources for 
doctrines include official documents and departmental directives, 
national budgets, documents pertaining to arms procurement, 
arms production statistics, and documents regarding the training, 
armaments, organization and location of troops.' 
International seminars, such as the Vienna Seminar on 
Military Doctrine held in conjunction with the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), have, to some extent, 
made the formulation of doctrines more uniform. However, states 
tend to interpret their texts to suit their own national interests, so 
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that published doctrines are still not directly comparable. The 
tendency is there, nevertheless, and uniformity, especially in the 
case of strategic doctrines, can be expected to increase in the 
future. 
2 FACTORS SHAPING MILITARY 
DOCTRINE 
The factors that shape doctrines have been analysed by many 
experts in different circumstances. Samuel P. Huntington lists 
the following as determinants of military doctrines: 
— the degree of parity of the opponents 
— the composition of each opponent's armed forces 
— the support and opinions of their allies 
— public opinion 
— the sensibleness of deterrence 
— economic factors 
— historical factors 
— war experiences, both one's own and others' 
— the terrain 
— the perceived threat 
— popular opinion in an occupied territory' 
In his 1982 article, Christopher N. Donnelly, a Soviet expert 
at the Royal British Military Academy, cites ideology, the 
prevailing situation, history and technology as factors influencing 
Soviet military doctrine.' 
Although Huntington's and Donnelly's lists are parallel and 
include the fundamental factors, they are not exhaustive. Posen7 
argues that doctrines are shaped by bureaucratic, power political, 
technological and geographic factors. The relative importance of 
the first two declined as political and military environments 
stabilized after World War II and it is still too early to assess the 
consequences of the instability of the past two years. 
In the model employed in this work, which is a slight 
modification of Posen's, geographic, political, economic and other 
resource, and military factors are considered to be the primary 
determinants of military doctrine. The models is presented in 
figure 1. 
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Although the model is highly simplified, it offers a good 
starting point for comprehensive analysis. As shown in figure 2, 
the four sets of factors in figure 1 are, in fact, closely interrelated. 
For example, geographic factors furnish a basis for political, 
economic and military activities. Political developments influence 
military and economic decision-making and may contribute to a 
re-evaluation of geographic factors. Military matters, in turn, are 
a part of foreign policy and influence economic decisions. 
Recurring military threats require a continuing evaluation and 
re-evaluation of geographic determinants. Concentration of 
economic activity into a particular location changes the geographic 
significance of that area and sets constraints on political and 
military action. The relationship between military doctrines and 
the factors that shape them is also a reciprocal one. Although 
technological planning will already be under way when doctrines 
are being formulated, policies, once selected, provide the arms 
industry and military organizations with a guide to future 
developments. A realistic military doctrine guides foreign policy-
making in times of crisis and works to direct resources towards a 
realization of the specific goals. 
A detailed analysis based on the model of figure 19 suggests 
that the geographic factors shaping doctrine of a country or 
alliance are 
— location 
— size 
— shape 
— infrastructure 
— physical features, watercourses, natural barriers 
— distances (as related to the above factors) 
— climate 
— amount of daylight 
— type of soil and 
— vegetation.10 
The corresponding list of political factors includes 
— quality and nature of the prevailing political system 
— chosen political goals 
— world view of those formulating doctrine 
— prevailing political environment 
— political history 
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— international agreements 
— degree of political integration 
— domestic political situation and 
— public opinion." 
Economic and other resource determinants of military 
doctrine are more or less the same as the factors giving rise to 
national prosperity in general. These include 
— raw material and energy resources, to the degree that they are 
exploitable 
— structure, condition and productivity of the economy 
— transportation and communication infrastructure 
— level of research and innovation 
— general technological level 
— distribution of costs and economic resources and 
— size and structure of the population.12 
The military factors comprise 
— war experiences and military tradition 
— military threat 
— former doctrines 
— quality of the military leadership 
— military technology and 
— available military force and its organization. 13 
If nothing else, the above lists demonstrate that a multiplicity 
of factors shape doctrines. The large number of determinants 
becomes indeed cumbrous when the impact of arms technology 
on doctrines is singled out for study. Proper evaluation of the 
impact requires that one examine each feature of arms technology 
in relation to a specific change in doctrine, at the same time 
bearing in mind those other factors (figure 1) that may modify 
the effect. One must consider how the effect of new arms 
technology has been or will be modified in response to the 
influence of each geographic, political, economic and other 
resource, and military determinant. The relationship is illustrated 
schematically in figure 3. 
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Improvements in military technology depend upon doctrine 
and upon technological innovation, but the relative weight of the 
two factors would be difficult to determine. Doctrine, in turn, is 
shaped by three different categories of arms technology: (1) 
strategic nuclear and strategic defence armaments, (2) mass 
destruction and conventional armaments on the operations and 
tactical level and (3) supporting command, control, 
communications, intelligence (C3I) and electronic warfare systems. 
A possible fourth category, which will not be discussed in this 
paper, is particle beam and laser weapons and technology aimed 
at controlling the various regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Though achieved to some extent at arms control and 
disarmament negotiations, a sharp separation of the different 
categories of armaments is not really possible. All nuclear arms 
are strategic in the sense that they form a path of escalation from 
tactical level to increasingly long-range and destructive systems. 
Owing to their range and effectiveness ballistic missiles equipped 
with modem conventional warheads must sometimes be classified 
as strategic weapons. The operations of the superpowers' 
conventional forces are a part of global grand strategy. The effects 
of biological weapons could spread to a very wide area with 
consequences of strategic magnitude. Although not absolute, 
therefore, the above classification is nevertheless useful as a 
means of simplifying the analysis. 
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3 STRATEGIC LEVEL 
3.1 The evolution and ramifications of nuclear arms 
technology 
Nuclear balance has traditionally been measured by a triad 
consisting of the total number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs), Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and strategic 
bombers. The advent of cruise missiles required a modification 
to the triad. Nuclear parity, achieved by the eastern and western 
camps during the 1960s, did not require that the numbers balance 
in all three sectors. It was enough that the totals were equivalent. 
More recently, analysts have moved away from the alliance-
based triad towards a model that describes the central balance 
between the two superpowers. 
Since the start of the disarmament negotiations, nuclear 
weapons have been divided into three groups: short-, medium-
and long-range. Alternatively they can be classified as tactical, 
intermediate and strategic. Technological advances during the 
1980s now make it possible for the superpowers to carry out a 
nuclear strike almost anywhere in the world. 
The effectiveness and range of nuclear weapons has 
improved through increase in the number of warheads and 
improved penetration, accuracy and electronic protection of the 
missiles. The greater number of warheads and the ability to 
point them at different targets now provide a multiple strike 
capacity. Multiple warheads and reduced detestability of missiles 
have made defence against a nuclear strike more difficult. 
ICBMs are vulnerable and require protective measures such 
as hardening of silos, mobility of launching platforms and 
installation of missiles in submarines where they are hard to 
detect. These steps in turn have led to an increase in the second 
strike capability, and thereby a higher employment threshold 
and greater deterrent value for nuclear arms. The development 
of the cruise missile allows greater accuracy in hitting targets in 
the intermediate and short range. 
In the development of strategic bombers the emphasis has 
been on improving the weaponry, mainly the cruise missile, and 
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the ability to penetrate the opponent's defences. As well, the 
lifespan of older aircraft has been extended by equipping them 
with cruise missiles. Stealth technology has opened the way to 
bombers that are virtually invisible to radar. As a result, the role 
of the air force in strategic nuclear doctrine remains strong. 
Development at the operations and tactical level has been 
similar to that of strategic nuclear weapons. The objective here 
has been to develop arms that cause as little collateral damage as 
possible so that the operations area can be utilized for one's own 
purposes in the next phase of battle. The neutron bomb is a 
classic example of these new weapons. 
These developments in nuclear weapons make it possible to 
choose at will, according to the threat, the range, accuracy and 
effect of the retaliatory or pre-emptive strike. In the early Cold 
War period, nuclear deterrence was the primary factor shaping 
doctrines. 
The development of Soviet nuclear and conventional arms 
technology in the early 1960s broke American confidence in the 
massive retaliation they thought guaranteed by their nuclear 
monopoly. Responding to the scenario of mutually assured 
destruction, the West developed a concept of flexible response 
according to which unlimited nuclear war should be avoided 
and the response to threat or aggression should be a controlled 
one. Even movement downward on the escalation ladder was 
thought to be possible. 
As weapons improved, the strategies of massive retaliation 
and the broad targeting of urban areas yielded to an increasingly 
accurate pinpointing of targets. This trend can be seen in the 
constant reconstruction of target lists. Targets on Western lists 
included Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, military-political 
headquarters and economic-industrial areas. In principle, the 
categorization of targets was intended to allow a selective, limited 
or general use of weapons according to assessment of the regional, 
military and political situation. The Soviet Union also had a 
target list but its contents are not well known. 
In American doctrine, nuclear weapons would be resorted 
to only when all other options had been exhausted. First use was 
not ruled out if the situation warranted. NATO policy, which 
was dependent on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, was similar in 
content. Up until the 1980s, the improvements in Soviet arms 
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technology and Soviet mass production were considered to 
underscore the importance of a first strike. Europeans, too, clung 
to the belief that the new weapons would make possible a first 
strike, but one justly proportioned so as to allow controlled 
escalation, resulting in only limited nuclear war. 
With the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range 
nuclear arms in Europe in the early 1980s the West filled out its 
arsenal to cover all ranges, as was called for in Western doctrine. 
Simultaneously, the Soviet Union achieved approximately the 
same status by deploying its SS-20 missiles. Other factors affecting 
doctrine were assuming importance, however, and eventually 
these would alter the entire significance of nuclear weapons. 
Today, faith in the possibility of a limited nuclear war has 
all but dissipated, while the fear that crossing the nuclear 
threshold will inevitably lead to escalation and unlimited nuclear 
war has become more entrenched. Even the purpose of a gradual 
escalation is sometimes questioned. Once the nuclear threshold 
is crossed, it is argued, then why not move directly to the highest 
level? 
With international agreements not providing for an adequate 
crisis-control mechanism and the public horrified by the prospect 
of nuclear war, political leaders moved to take action. Nuclear 
arms began to lose their credibility as useful weapons, and the 
idea strengthened that at least a part of them should be destroyed. 
Economic factors entered the picture at the same time. The 
United States had challenged the Soviets to an arms race that 
drained its economy. The U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 
launched in 1983 may have represented the final, impossible 
challenge. The credibility of the communist ideology began to 
crumble both in the Soviet Union and in third world countries. 
As well, the damage to the environment caused by industry, 
especially the military industrial complex, turned into a politically 
explosive issue. 
With the many new factors now at play, the final outcome 
may be entirely different from what was anticipated in the early 
1980s. Although research and development of nuclear arms 
undoubtedly continues, the two superpowers appear ready to 
go a long way towards abandoning their weapons of mass 
destruction. Now that the Cold War has ended and its structures 
are slowly disappearing, the nuclear balance between the 
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superpowers is less significant than before. Nevertheless, it 
appears that nuclear arms will, at least for some time, remain in 
the world and in doctrines as a form of final guarantee against 
sudden changes in the thinking of the other side. 
The latest indicator of the role of nuclear weapons is the 
changes in NATO strategy announced in November 1991.14 
Nuclear deterrence will remain as policy, partly as a 
counterbalance to the nuclear weaponry of the former Soviet 
Union, and partly as a precaution against problems that may 
arise in Eastern Europe. Russia will also maintain its nuclear 
deterrence, but other members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) have publicly declared that they will 
relinquish nuclear weapons, and so also give up the nuclear part 
of their military doctrines. In reality, the transportation and 
destruction of nuclear weapons will take time and it is conceivable 
that political and doctrinal thinking will change in the meantime. 
Contrary to the general trend, the French are taking steps to 
increase their national nuclear deterrence to a level that would 
cover the whole of Europe. The evident objective is to escape the 
dependence on the American nuclear umbrella. 
3.2 The proliferation of nuclear arms 
The concept of nuclear deterrence as a guarantor of national 
security enjoyed wide support during the Cold War. At least 
China, the United Kingdom and France achieved a level of know-
how enabling them to manufacture nuclear weapons and create 
their own mini-deterrences. The Soviet Union, from time to time, 
has demanded that limitations under the strategic arms limitations 
negotiations should apply to the nuclear weapons of all countries, 
but none of these other countries have agreed to the Soviet 
demands. Nuclear arms have retained their place in doctrines 
despite the recent changes that have drastically reduced the 
threat of war in Europe. France, indeed, is reducing the number 
of her short-range missiles, but leaves the Germans wondering 
how, and against whom, France plans to use the remaining 
tactical weapons. 
Nuclear arms technology has proliferated outside of the 
United States and Europe. In addition to China, altogether 13 
countries are believed to possess or to be developing nuclear 
weapons." It is reasonable to assume that nuclear deterrence 
forms part of the secret doctrines of these countries. Recent 
disclosures regarding Israel's nuclear capability, and that of Iraq 
and other Islamic countries, have prompted a re-evaluation of 
strategic thinking in the United States and Russia. 
In their arguments for the alteration of existing and 
development of new missile defence systems the Great Powers 
note the possession of nuclear arms by several developing 
countries. While it is unlikely that their programmes are 
technically very advanced, their role in a North-South or 
comparable conflict is a matter of surmise, and accidental use is 
always a risk. One may therefore expect that, even though the 
superpowers cease to threaten each other with nuclear weapons, 
ballistic missile defence will remain, in diminished form, a part 
of the doctrines of the United States and the successor states of 
the Soviet Union, and it will probably become a part of the 
strategies of NATO and the larger European countries. A political 
level offer by the United States to help upgrade the Russian 
missile defences speaks for this argument.16 The new NATO 
military strategy mentions missile defence, though the recent 
Rome Communique does not discuss when and how it will be 
implemented. It is known, moreover, that NATO countries have 
acquired and will continue to acquire the Patriot missiles which 
were battle tested in the Gulf War. The need for a missile defence 
system would appear to be intensified by the uncertainty over 
who will come to possess the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and over the 
political aspirations and military doctrines of the successor states. 
3.3 The arming of space 
The military use of space has grown together with its non-military 
use. Space is used militarily in at least four different ways. It 
provides the passage way for ballistic missiles. It is the location 
for the most important strategic intelligence, command, control 
and communication (C3I) equipment. In the future, equipment 
used in the fight for control of the electromagnetic spectrum will 
be located there. And finally although the latest U.S. budget 
suggests otherwise, space-based weapons are still under 
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development." 
Military surveillance systems that operate outside the 
atmosphere have been in use since the 1950s. The imaging and 
measuring technology of satellite intelligence systems continues 
to improve. Satellites can now monitor the use of the entire 
electromagnetic spectrum over a broad geographic area. With 
radar and television systems even ocean areas can be monitored. 
Militarily, satellite systems allow observation of the movement, 
location and activity of enemy troops and equipment, facilitating 
earlier warnings and better defence readiness. 
Space technology also improves the accuracy and 
effectiveness of weapons. Satellites help guide aircraft and missiles 
to their targets. SLBMs are now able to achieve the same accuracy 
as the best silo missiles. It is thought, for example, that Trident 
missiles could be used as effective first strike weapons even 
against the hardened silos of the former Soviet area. 
Command and communication systems are developing in 
pace with reconnaissance and control systems. Space-based 
systems enable the superior command to command troops 
worldwide. During the Gulf conflict, the Pentagon was able to 
give immediate detailed descriptions of the battle situation. 
Naturally, only information that suited U.S. purposes was 
publicized. Thanks to advanced information processing 
techniques, to a large extent information gathering, compiling 
and analysis took place somewhere else than the battlefield. 
Analysed information was then transferred to the commander of 
the particular sector, who thus, too, benefitted from the space 
system. Much of the reconnaissance information from the 
commanders' own forces likewise was transmitted via satellite 
link. 
The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) announced by the 
United States in 1983 touched off a mammoth programme of 
research and development into space-based missile defence 
systems. In addition to traditional defensive missiles, 
investigations were launched into beam, particle and kinetic 
technologies. Plans called for weapons to be installed both on 
earth and in space. In 1983, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov announced 
the Soviet version of SDI in the Moscow daily Isvestija. Even 
Party Leader Mikhail Gorbachev promised early in his term that 
the Soviet Union would develop a response to the SDI in space, 
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on earth and in the air. 
Even though strategic defence is a part of Great Power 
doctrine, weapons development plans have not gone forward as 
anticipated ten years ago, and neither existing nor potential space 
weaponry has influenced doctrines to any great extent. SDI was 
opposed in the early days because it was perceived to upset the 
existing nuclear balance and to guarantee the United States a 
first strike capability. Within the United States, some of the 
opposition was rooted in domestic politics and in disagreement 
over the allocation of resources. 
The first U.S. space doctrine dates back to 1982. In the same 
year the space and missile organization of the Air Force was 
renamed the Space Command. The Navy received its own Space 
Command the following year. These developments by themselves 
were a sign of a significant shift in doctrine.18 
It soon became clear that it was unnecessary to engage the 
Soviet Union in a race for the use of space as its economy was 
already collapsing. Since then the SDI has been modified - dreams 
have been replaced by realism, at least as far as timetables are 
concerned. The most recent indicator is the U.S. decision to employ 
only surface-based defensive missiles for the time being. Space-
based missiles will not be deployed in the foreseeable future. 
Space-based command, control, communication and 
intelligence systems have reinforced the defensive posture of 
doctrines. Moreover, the better overall picture of situations, and 
the better ability to command, facilitate a more flexible, versatile 
and expedient use of force while lessening risks. As manifested 
by certain new offensive aspects of present U.S and NATO 
doctrines, the ability to carry out an attack has improved as well. 
Both superpowers have improved their ability to intervene far 
away from their own territory. Owing to the long distances 
involved, both the American Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) 
and Soviet airborne forces require highly advanced support 
systems. 
The implications of space-based military technology are not 
readily studied. Although it may be easy to assess the declared 
doctrines and expenditures of the United States, the details of 
technological advance and the hidden agendas will scarcely be 
uncovered. Until recently, assessment has been even more difficult 
for the Soviet Union. 
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3.4 The global use of conventional forces 
The use of force to protect their interests worldwide is an inherent 
part of the strategies of the Great Powers. The most recent 
examples are the Falklands War, the Panama Operation, the Gulf 
War and the French action in Africa. According to the United 
States, grand strategy securing national interests is predicated 
upon three central concepts: forward presence, power projection 
and reconstitution. In other words, ability to influence events in 
distant areas requires a presence in that area, a movement of 
forces into the area if necessary and a formation of back-up 
troops at home. 
Continued presence and intervention require technological 
means with which to move the troops to the target area, ensure 
their operation and support their logistics needs. Three aspects 
require examination: command and support technology, transport 
technology and the transportability of systems. 
A comprehensive C3I system is essential when operating 
worldwide. Although many of the C3I subsystems cannot be 
classified as weapons technology as such, the same technical 
innovations exploited in C3I have been incorporated in weapons 
systems. Command, control, communication and intelligence are 
even more difficult to separate from weaponry when it comes to 
weapons use. Certainly one aspect of command, and in wartime 
the most important, is the effectiveness of weapons. An integrated 
C3I system allows the use of sophisticated and far-reaching 
weapons to support troop operations in distant parts. Today's 
increasingly sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft, remotely 
piloted vehicles, electronic warfare systems and early warning 
aircraft, together with the space component, improve the 
command of troops and weapons systems in a major way. 
The versatile support now offered by aircraft carriers is one 
of the most significant developments in global operations. In the 
past, the task of such carriers was merely to provide fire and air 
support to ground troops. New tasks include electronic warfare, 
helicopter or even transport aircraft support, precision guided 
weapons (e.g. cruise missiles) and the antitank capability provided 
by the improved weaponry of fighter aircraft. 
Transportability of weapons systems by both sea and air has 
improved. The transport capacity particularly of the Great Powers 
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has expanded through the availability of larger aircraft with 
longer range. Parallel development of military and civilian aircraft 
means that the latter can be conscripted for military purposes: 
airlifts of large troop formations to distant locations have already 
taken place. The same aircraft can service troops and equipment 
through supply and evacuation flights. The utility of helicopters 
has improved through increase in their capacity, range and speed. 
Opening of a battle front by troops transported by sea has 
become easier as a result of the development of landing and 
support vessels, amphibious and semi-amphibious 
reconnaissance vehicles, hovercraft, armoured fighting vehicles 
and main battle tanks. Improvements in amphibious equipment 
enable the unloading of landing forces far from the shore. 
The weapons technology of transportable troops has 
undergone dramatic change. Armoured vehicles have become 
lighter and their firepower has increased. Similar developments 
in ammunition have further improved transportability. 
Lightweight yet effective missile systems mean that infantry can 
bring their own antitank and anti-aircraft weapons to the 
battlefield. Troops also possess adequate electronic warfare 
equipment for opening of the battlefront, allowing the operation 
and command of their weapons systems to be immediately 
secured. 
Interventions have long been a component of Great Power 
doctrines. In the past, geographic factors have been a major 
obstacle to their execution. Now, the technology described above 
enables Great Powers to influence events anywhere in the world. 
The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces were originally created to 
secure American strategic interests in the Middle East and Africa. 
The concept of power projection, or at least the crisis response 
aspect of it, can be viewed as an interventionist component of 
U.S. strategic doctrines. A similar interventionist policy was a 
part of Soviet doctrine, with its ideological commitment to defend 
socialist interests. The aircraft of certain Soviet airborne units, for 
example, have sufficient payload capacity to drop heavy 
equipment, including ordnance and armoured vehicles. New 
technology has thus made it possible for the Great Powers to 
intervene around the world without having to depend on fixed 
bases. In the recent Gulf crisis, only 8% of the total materials used 
by the U.S. and its allies were pre-stored in the area and some of 
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that 8% was stored on board ships.19 
New technology has made possible the U.S. Navy's Over 
The Horizon (OTH) doctrine, which provides the framework for 
the Navy, entirely on its own, to open a battlefront after sea 
transit. OTH was designed to allow quick response to threats 
directed at the United States or its allies. In case of a larger 
conflict in a bipolar world, OTH would have offered the 
alternative of horizontal escalation, for example into Asia, if the 
European situation so required. In the new strategic thinking, 
OTH is an adjunct to Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) doctrine, 
which provides for getting involved in critical areas early in the 
crisis. 
LIC doctrine is also invocable in the fight against illicit drug 
trade, terrorism, even organized crime. In this case OTH and 
airborne Special Operations could be supported by faster moving 
and better equipped Special Operation Forces in order to control 
the threat. The new arms technology in general has made it 
easier to employ special forces in tasks all over the world. 
NATO's new military strategy emphasizes multinationality 
and constant readiness of forces in the protection of member 
nations against crisis. As this, in many cases, involves moving 
troops to sectors far away from their home base, the 
transportability of troops and weapons becomes critically 
important. The planned composition of NATO's Rapid Reaction 
Corps2° seems to require, for example, that Holland form airborne 
forces and Denmark transport troops to the south of France. This 
change in doctrine has more to do with political considerations 
than technological factors. Underpinning the new strategy, 
nevertheless, is the fact that new arms technology increases the 
mobility and flexibility of troops so that even the troops of small 
nations are "within reach". Multinational operations require a 
harmonizing of troops and standardizing of weaponry. The end 
result will be a growing commitment to similar weapons systems 
and increasingly unified doctrines within the NATO camp. 
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4 THEATRE-LEVEL OPERATIONS 
4.1 The evolution of Soviet military doctrine 
The Soviet military doctrine was comprehensive in the sense that 
it identified the likely opponent, the nature of the conflict, the 
military objectives and the functions of the armed forces. It 
provided guidelines for the development of specific branches, 
specified the urgency of preparations, and indicated the methods 
of waging war by prescribing strategy, operations and tactics. 
Conversely, as components of military science, these factors 
shaped the development of overall policy. Minor changes did 
not, however, necessitate altering of such a broad-based and 
universal doctrine.21  
The battle principles of Soviet military doctrine were offense, 
the element of surprise, concentration of overwhelming forces at 
critical points, massive use of troops and firepower, operations 
in the opponent's rear, and secret and covert operations involving 
ABC weapons.22 Battle principles were heavily influenced by 
World War II experiences, while responding to changes in political 
goals and to technological innovation.23  
The Soviet view of future war was formed from conclusions 
about advances in their own and enemy military technology. 
Battle, it was thought, would be short and fierce since, in the 
Soviet perspective, all military conflicts between East and West 
would irrevocably escalate into a general nuclear war. As in the 
U.S., new technology in all fields of weaponry swelled the number 
of types of warfare in the Soviet strategy during the 1980s.24 
Doctrines of the Warsaw Pact countries followed the Soviet 
lead as the impact of the new arms technology was felt through 
Soviet doctrinal development. Although the member nation forces 
differed in composition as the result of an internal division of 
tasks, there would be little point in examining each state 
separately, since the conclusions would be similar to those drawn 
from an analysis of the Soviet case. 
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4.2 The final years of Soviet battle doctrine 
In its final years, Soviet operational and tactical battle doctrine 
was based on operational and tactical principles laid out in the 
general military doctrine. The main battle practice was to be an 
echeloned attack in which waves of troops followed one another, 
asserting continuous pressure on the defender. No lull should be 
allowed in the battle during which the defender could recover 
and regroup. Once the defence broke, second and third echelons 
of attack would be directed at the opponent's vital areas. The 
doctrine assumed the use of armoured mobile groups whose 
task would be to penetrate deep into the opponent's rear, to cut 
communication lines and destroy enveloped enemy troops. Earlier 
the targets of the mobile group had been fairly close to the front. 
During the 1980s, many Western observers came to believe 
that the Soviet organization, division of the theatre of operations, 
command system and battle doctrine were undergoing a 
transformation. A new emphasis on mobility, cooperation 
between different services and branches, and an increased use of 
special forces suggested a move towards more offensive and 
deeper striking "Blitzkrieg"-type operations, intended to turn 
the tactical successes of earlier mobile groups into operational or 
even strategic successes. The end result would be a doctrine 
allowing for all contingencies, including the use of weapons of 
mass destruction. The doctrine would be more flexible than before 
and provide for the use of many types of warfare. Although 
Western assessments did not rest on hard evidence, they did 
suggest more or less accurately, how new arms technology was 
influencing doctrinal development within the Warsaw Pact 
alliance. The Soviet military-industrial complex also continued 
to turn out fairly sophisticated weaponry for the massive forces 
required in a decisive strike. The recent partial opening of archives 
has confirmed the Western assessment of the Soviet threat to be 
broadly correct. 
Putting evidence from various sources together, Western 
analysts came to postulate the existence of a new formation, 
which they called the Operational Manoeuver Group (OMG).'1  
At the level of a front the OMG would perhaps be made up of 
elite tank units. In an army the OMG might have consisted of a 
tank or a motorized infantry division, supplemented with 
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helicopters and combined arms troops equipped with the latest 
weapons technology. Support would have been provided by a 
substantial tactical air strike capability. Such a "supergroup" 
would have operated more or less independently, although under 
the direction of the army commander. Its task would have been 
to penetrate deep inside the enemy territory, to destroy crucial 
military objectives during the all important early days of the 
battle. Penetration would take place through an opening created 
by the first wave, or else the OMG itself would break through a 
weak point in the defence. The primary objective of the OMGs, 
Western analysts surmised, was to prevent the opponent from 
maintaining an organized defence along a contiguous front. 
Activities in the opponent's rear would concentrate on destroying 
launching pads and storage facilities for nuclear weapons, 
important control, command and communications centres, lines 
of transportation and service depots. Support to the rear would 
be provided by special forces and aerial operations. 
It has been suggested that the creation of the OMG was 
influenced by technological innovations in both East and West. 
NATO weaponry had begun to threaten the viability of the 
traditional attack doctrine. Tactical nuclear weapons, air force, 
helicopters, rocket launchers, remotely delivered mines and other 
aerial weapons were all perceived as new and major threats by 
the Warsaw Pact. 
Earlier Soviet doctrine had assumed the formation of distinct 
fronts. The opposing forces would remain apart until a mobile 
group had advanced behind the defender's lines. So long as the 
fronts were separated, NATO would be able to use tactical nuclear 
weapons against the Warsaw Pact troops; but the penetration of 
an OMG deep amongst NATO forces, it was thought, would 
prevent a nuclear retaliation around the immediate battlefield. 
The continuing nuclear threat to the rear of the Warsaw Pact 
forces left no other choice but their dispersal over a broad area. 
Some observers believed that the OMG would be made up of the 
appropriate forces only just prior to battle. It was thought that 
the Warsaw Pact was moving towards the use of balanced 
divisional formations, to which armoured and motorized forces 
could be attached as necessary. 
The continued motorization of forces and especially the 
massive use of relatively modern tanks improved the possibilities 
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for dispersion and rapid penetration. Even if seizing of the 
initiative failed and NATO, being weaker in conventional forces, 
resorted to nuclear weapons, some Warsaw Pact tanks would 
retain their ability to function thanks to ABC protection. Forces 
would be able to advance through and perhaps even fight in the 
contaminated areas. Possibly the Soviets would have used their 
own nuclear weapons to ensure success. NATO missile launching 
pads and storage facilities would perhaps have become prime 
targets for the OMG's various sabotage and commando groups. 
The increased threat that NATO air forces posed to advancing 
troops and their service lines led to changes in the organization 
of the air force and in Soviet air defences. Evidently the air force 
had earlier been entirely under the command of the front 
commander and his superiors. During the 1980s, howeverwever, 
parts of it were placed under the army commander to ensure that 
the OMG would receive adequate fighter cover and direct and 
continuous fire support. Such a change would allow better 
coordination between troop movements and air cover. The new 
tactical aircraft and helicopters would improve the operation of 
the OMG. Moreover, how more independent of central fire 
command, the more mobile and better protected air defence 
troops would be able to keep pace with the fast moving units, 
providing them with better protection. 
NATO's air defence, upgraded by new aircraft and surface-
to-air missiles, forced change in the operational principles of the 
Warsaw Pact air forces. Western defences became targets for 
specific aerial operations. The battle against NATO air defences 
also appears to have increased the importance of air-transported 
and other special forces that operate behind enemy lines. All 
offensive aerial operations, involving aircraft, missiles and 
airmobile forces, were to be carried out either independently or 
in close cooperation with ground troops. Conventional, chemical 
or nuclear warheads would be targeted at air fields and major 
weapons systems. At the same time, emphasis was put on 
improving the air defences of the Warsaw Pact's own main bases. 
NATO's new assault aircraft and antitank helicopters 
increased the vulnerability of Warsaw Pact air defences. Western 
analysts believed that, as a result, a portion of the air defence 
responsibility was to be transferred to counter air helicopters. 
Technological advances in Warsaw Pact air forces allowed better 
fire support to ground troops and enabled this to be delivered 
quickly to areas beyond the reach of artillery weapons. About 
half of the OMGs' fire support would come from the air. 
Helicopters would be responsible for protecting the friendly rear 
and flanks. Transport helicopters would increase the number of 
landings in enemy territory, and combat helicopters and tactical 
aircraft would provide fire support for airmobile operations. The 
role of helicopters and tactical aircraft was increased in the new 
doctrine as these were to begin operations deep inside the enemy 
territory simultaneously with the main attack. 
The whole concept of the OMG assumes a situation in which 
tanks continue to have an advantage over antitank weapons. 
Although NATO's deployment of modern antitank technology, 
albeit slowed by the high cost, should have reversed the situation, 
giving the defender a definite edge, NATO's inability to mobilize 
quickly would not have allowed even its improved antitank 
units to be deployed fast enough to repel an attack by a peacetime-
strength OMG, let alone one of wartime strength. In the final 
analysis, however, the nuclear threat and NATO's defence 
capability would seem to have persuaded the Warsaw Pact to 
abandon the idea of conquering the whole of Western Europe. 
Evidently, it was content with limited goals that would provide 
room for political manoeuvring. 
Obstacles such as NATO remotely delivered mines would 
have slowed the OMG offensive at a crucial moment. To reduce 
the threat, the delivery systems should be attacked. In addition 
to air defence operations, it was important to prevent the firing 
of missiles and artillery carrying mines. Launching pads and fire 
positions could be attacked with counter-artillery. Artillery 
missiles would be suitable for long-range operations and the 
immediate support of mobile groups, while self-propelled artillery 
could be used against shorter-range antitank weapons. Tactical 
aircraft and indirect artillery fire would look after mortars and 
rocket launchers. 
The use of OMGs could only succeed if the activities of all 
branches of arms were coordinated in the attack area. Self-
propelled artillery with increased range improved fire support. 
Even as regards fire delivery, the OMG could be scattered at the 
staging area. Direct fire capability increased the protection against 
enemy tanks, and in some circumstances allowed the use of 
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indirect fire against enemy tanks in accordance with the forward 
leaning principle included in earlier battle doctrine. A more 
mobile, far-reaching and independent anti-air defence removed 
the restrictions that an earlier vulnerability had put on fast-
moving ground troops. New mine-clearing techniques and the 
possibility of circumvention through the use of transport 
helicopters contributed to a speedy forward push and reduced 
the significance of terrain obstacles. The need for rapid logistics 
support increased. The armouring of vital service vehicles, along 
with the protection provided by other branches, improved the 
ability to service troops in hard to reach places deep in the 
opponent's rear. Helicopter transport became increasingly 
important. Combined-arms operations led to changes in 
command practices: rigidity was replaced by flexible and 
innovative command methods. 
Battle capability in the opponent's rear was improved by 
equipping armoured fighting vehicles and main battle tanks 
with antitank missiles. Portable and vehicle-mounted missiles 
required fire position preparation, which meant that they were 
useful only in protecting OMG flanks and lines of communication. 
Special forces and sabotage groups evidently were significant 
in the new doctrine. Lightweight personal battle gear, portable 
antitank and anti-aircraft systems, along with other weaponry 
now increasingly air transportable, improved the capability to 
operate in difficult conditions deep inside enemy territory. The 
new weapons systems positioned in the enemy rear intensified 
the need for special forces. Special purpose forces were useful for 
pinpointing targets for long-range missiles and the air force. 
The new technology fundamentally improved the Soviet 
capability to carry out a surprise attack. Mobility, the ability of 
combined arms to keep up, the ability to achieve air superiority 
along the axes of advance, the availability of fire support and 
sophisticated darkness and all-weather capabilities lessened the 
dependence on favourable weather or lighting conditions. 
Working to the same effect was the simultaneous activity over a 
wide area in the opponent's rear. The Soviet Union modernized 
its European forces and concentrated its newest technology and 
strongest units at the Central Front in the German Democratic 
Republic and Poland. One can conclude that offensiveness and 
an element of surprise were key concepts of Soviet battle doctrine 
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prior to the breakdown in Europe. Improvements in Western 
surveillance, early warning and command systems to some degree 
decreased the Soviet ability to conceal its activities and, by the 
same token, weakened the element of surprise. 
Concentration of overwhelming forces in the decisive sector 
and massive use of firepower remained in the Soviet doctrine 
despite the new need to scatter troops. Concentration was made 
possible by improved mobility and the effectiveness and correct 
timing of aerial fire support. The closer cooperation between 
battle and support forces meant that one could talk about the 
operations of combined arms. 
4.3 The concept of sufficient defence 
Faced with economic and ideological collapse the Soviet Union 
was forced to alter its foreign policy and agree gradually to 
withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe and the newly 
independent Baltic countries. It has many times been observed 
by analysts that earlier Soviet military doctrine has now been 
replaced by a new defensive doctrine of sensible sufficiency. 
Besides the withdrawal of troops, the new foreign policy is evident 
in progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations, 
unilateral reductions of nuclear arms, withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, discontinued military assistance to developing 
countries and announcements regarding troop reductions and 
reductions in the military-industrial complex. 
The change in Russian foreign policy doctrine is clear. And 
it is equally clear that economic factors have been the major 
catalyst for change. The chances of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States formulating a joint military doctrine are 
minimal. At best it may be able to reach some kind of an agreement 
with regards to nuclear weapons and, even then, possibly only in 
terms of arms reductions. In January of 1992, German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl argued, in disagreement with the above, that 
economic aid to CIS should be delayed in view of the unfavourable 
new military doctrine being formulated.26 
As chief successor to the Soviet Union, Russia is likely to 
develop not only a new grand strategy but a new battle doctrine 
as well. At least in public declarations this is likely to be defensive 
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in nature. It will, however, have to take into account the 
tremendous size of the Russian territory and its numerous security 
interests in many directions. These factors, by their very nature, 
put a premium on mobility and offensiveness. 
Russia also inherits most of former Soviet weaponry and a 
defence industry that, while undergoing conversion, continues 
to produce modern, and even new weapons. The radical cuts in 
arms procurement announced in early 199227 will not cause 
conventional weapons to become outdated until about ten years 
from now. It is worth noting that, generally speaking, the East 
lags about ten years behind the West in technology. In some 
areas it is not even possible for the East to develop weapons 
systems that correspond to Western systems; in others, as in the 
field of conventional electronic warfare, however, they are 
sometimes ahead of the West. This type of assessment depends, 
of course, upon the perceived opponent: Russia will retain a 
superiority in weaponry relative to the parts of the former Soviet 
Union and to China, even while her position relative to the West 
declines. 
Although weapons designed for offence can also be used 
defensively, this is not the most effective and optimal way of 
using modem systems. If the production of new weapons is 
drastically reduced, Russia will not be able to match the versatility, 
range, accuracy and effectiveness of Western artillery and missiles. 
She will also have to take into account the possibility of conflict 
not only with the West but with former Soviet republics equally 
equipped with herself. As a result, Russia is likely to maintain a 
certain degree of offensiveness in her battle doctrine. Supporting 
this conclusion in her move towards a massive and effective 
employment of existing systems. The new doctrine might be 
called mobile defence. The inevitable aging of weaponry puts 
added importance on innovation, and indeed, this resource is 
now being tapped as the demands of rigid ideology and an 
inflexible central command collapse. 
In addition to arms technology, the strategic-level political 
developments mentioned above influence battle doctrines. The 
treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), with its 
verification procedures, reduces the likehood of a surprise attack, 
but does not render it, nor the launching of a massive assault, 
impossible. Certainly neither the present nor the future leadership 
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of the former Soviet territory is likely to envision a conquest of 
Europe, or even a part of it. An attack could nevertheless occur, 
through escalation from some internal squabble among the 
successor states of the Soviet Union, some dispute over earlier 
territorial arrangements or, in the worst case, an attempt to 
compensate for damaged Russian national pride. Relative to 
earlier times, however, the threat from the East is considerably 
less daunting. 
4.4 The United States AirLand Battle 
The AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine of the United States army 
became public knowledge on 20 August 1982 when it was 
published in the army field manual.28 Unlike the earlier doctrine 
announced in 1976, the new version stressed offensiveness, 
defeating the opponent and winning the battle. The manual 
noted that the battlefield had changed, as a direct result of the 
new Warsaw Pact military technology. The main goal for the 
Americans was thus to counter the threat posed by the advances 
in enemy technology. This was to be accomplished by using their 
own technology and forces in a counter-offensive way, especially 
during the initial phases of the conflict. Comparing the new and 
earlier doctrines one is immediately struck by the new emphasis 
on air power. Moreover, although nuclear and chemical weapons 
received more attention than in 1976, the main thrust was towards 
utilizing conventional arms technology as far as possible. The 
most recent developments of the doctrine can be found in the 
1986 edition which includes, among other things, a discussion 
about managing low intensity conflicts. The experiences of the 
Gulf War are likely to bring about further adjustments to the 
doctrine in the near future. 
The underlying principles of ALB are initiative, mobility, 
combined-arms operations and, most importantly, deep strikes 
into enemy territory. Hitting the enemy rear and especially his 
supply lines is considered crucial. The objective is to weaken the 
invader's second and subsequent echelons and prevent them 
from joining the decisive battle. In the present situation, where 
the potential aggressor does not necessarily act in the echeloned 
manner distinctive of Warsaw Pact doctrine, the emphasis changes 
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to cutting off the chosen battle area from enemy influences. 
The technological advances within the Warsaw Pact meant 
that the U.S. army should be prepared to fight against light, well-
equipped troops. Particular note was taken of the Pact's special 
forces, terrorist groups and mechanized units. With the improved 
mobility of the opponent and the possibility of breakthroughs, 
formation of solid fronts was no longer considered feasible. The 
range and destructiveness of the opponent's land and air 
weapons, which matched or sometimes even exceeded those of 
the U.S., would allow the opponent to operate deep inside NATO 
territory. Securing these rear areas became important as the 
opponent increased the use of well-armed air and amphibiously 
transported troops. 
Successful operation on a battlefield deep inside enemy 
territory primarily depends on the increased firepower of air 
force and artillery. Although U.S. long-range weapons do not 
exist in great numbers, they are well suited for this task provided 
targets are selected with due care. New electronic and target 
acquisition systems assist in targeting the weapons.29 
Also well suited to fighting deep inside the opponent's 
territory are conventional and special forces equipped with the 
new weapons. The use of mobile forces to seize the initiative has 
become a more realistic option as weapons systems have become 
easier to transport and transport planes larger. The opportunities 
to penetrate the opponent's ranks on land have improved as a 
result of the greater mobility, protection and firepower of army 
weapons systems and the organizational improvements brought 
about by the Army 86 and other modernization programmes. 
Improved mobility of the friendly infantry has placed new 
demands on fire support and increased the need for combined-
arms operations. Technological developments in artillery and air 
defences have made possible continuous fire support even for 
troops far away from the fire positions. Fire support for ground 
forces has further been enhanced by the development of combat 
helicopters and tactical aircraft. Because this support does not 
rely on ground connections, it can greatly assist the battle of 
airborne forces in difficult terrain. 
Antitank activity has become a task for almost all branches, 
which are thereby better equipped to support one another. Enemy 
supply lines can be struck by aircraft- and helicopter-delivered 
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mines, while closer to the front, the mine-delivery capability of 
the artillery can be utilized. The increase in the number of antitank 
missiles improves close-range defences. For their part, helicopters 
and other advances in air forces increase the mobility and 
flexibility of antitank defences in accordance with the demands 
of the battlefield and battle doctrine. Tactical and intermediate-
range nuclear and conventional missiles can be used to strike 
distant fixed installations and forces. Thus deep attacks can be 
carried out without involving friendly ground troops at all. The 
credibility of ALB is improved by the precision and areal effect 
of antitank weapons whose various ranges provide flexible 
support for deep strikes. The 1982 army manual mentions long-
range weapons but without providing a full listing. The 1982 
doctrine assumed that battles would be fought with the new 
technology expected to emerge during the decade. 
It was believed in 1982 that the development of tactical 
nuclear weapons would alter the traditional balance between 
fire and movement. Nuclear weapons could clear the way for 
fast moving forces and stop the opponent deep in its rear. The 
army manual repeatedly emphasized preparedness to fight in 
areas contaminated by nuclear and chemical weapons and did 
not preclude a first strike. 
AirLand Battle 200030 is a modified and expanded version of 
ALB, which seeks to take account of the new arms technology 
with its space-based components. Adoption of this doctrine would 
signal a final step in the evolution of the battlefield into a 
composite of technological systems. The end objective is to replace 
nuclear weapons with an entirely new technology capable of 
nearly the same results. The proposal is targeted at the future - 
the year 2000 at the earliest. During the past few years, AirLand 
Battle 2000 has further evolved into AirLand Battle Future, or — 
the most recent title — Air Land Operations. This doctrine is 
expected to be wholly operationally about the year 2005. 
The new arms technology has decisively influenced military 
doctrines such as AirLand Battle 2000. Initiative and offensiveness 
are emphasized, with the purpose of isolating both the opponent's 
forces that are already engaged in battle and his reinforcements. 
Offensive strikes on objectives most critical to the aggressor — his 
air fields, supply depots, command and control lines and mobile 
forces - are considered first priority. Comparison of evolution of 
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ALB and the construction of the armed forces of a small country 
reveals a striking difference: the Great Power is able to create a 
concept and then the supporting technology, whereas the small 
country is always dependent on the available arms technology. 
4.5 The evolution of NATO doctrine 
Flexible response and its critics 
Although NATO's European members were sceptical of U.S. 
willingness to risk an all out nuclear war with the Soviet Union 
on account of Europe, they adapted their strategic doctrines to 
the Flexible Response principle announced in 1967. The Forward 
Defence part of this new concept assumed that the defence would 
begin at the eastern borders of the alliance at the same level of 
action as the aggression. As little ground as possible was to be 
lost, and whatever was lost was to be quickly recovered. If the 
attack was not repelled, the danger of escalation would increase. 
Deliberate escalation might be instituted, to persuade the 
aggressor to cease hostilities. This could be achieved through a 
carefully selected and controlled use of nuclear weapons, or by 
extending the fighting to a geographic location or technological 
sphere where the opponent was inferior. NATO was prepared to 
use nuclear weapons first. The ultimate threat was a general 
nuclear strike against the opponent's strategic capability.31  
The Forward Defence doctrine came under sharp criticism 
beginning in the 1970s. Fueling the criticism32 were the conclusions 
drawn from the development of friendly and enemy arms 
technology. The air power and extensive mechanization of the 
Warsaw Pact forces rendered highly questionable a strategy that 
placed nearly the entire NATO forces along a thin line at the 
border. The peacetime bases of the troops were so far away from 
probable wartime positions that getting there fast enough was in 
no way guaranteed. The growing number of armoured troops of 
the eastern alliance increased the significance of tank battles in 
the final outcome, especially since the West had fewer tanks. 
Such numerical deficiencies in NATO's conventional forces 
increased the pressure on the nuclear option. 
Nuclear weapons, too, came under continuous criticism, 
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especially tactical nuclear weapons, which were beginning to be 
viewed as both militarily ineffective and a risk for escalation. 
Their credibility suffered as a result. The new intermediate-range 
missiles were similarly criticized. Removal of tactical nuclear 
weapons would have created a higher escalation threshold 
between conventional weapons and intermediate-range missiles. 
Indeed this may have been the case during the late 1970s when 
short-range missiles were being removed from Europe. The 
dialogue indicated that defending Western Europe by 
conventional weapons alone was a seriously considered option. 
Arguing against this was the low cost of nuclear weapons. 
In the beginning there were two potential solutions to the 
problems besetting Flexible Response. The advocates of Forward 
Defence argued that modification of the present doctrine was 
sufficient. While others supported a solution based on an effective 
area defence. Both options relied significantly on the new arms 
technology. 
Where supply lines were deemed the aggressor's weak point, 
Forward Defence would be modified with the addition of mobile 
infantry units or new weapons. The opponent could be hit with 
the new antitank weaponry ranging from portable systems to 
cruise missiles, in activities spanning a wide area from front to 
rear. This approach would also make it unnecessary to resort to 
large-scale troop movements, or to make territorial concessions 
upon withdrawal - something that was criticized especially in 
West Germany.33  
The central concept of the area defence model, which was 
intended to remedy the lack of depth in Forward Defence, was 
that the aggressor should be tied up by a deep defensive 
deployment, while one's own critical areas should be held at all 
cost. Potential enemy losses from having to commit troops to 
extended battles in a wide area were to be the deterrent. The area 
defence option would require the use of new antitank weapons, 
especially missiles. These, it was assumed, would make the 
defender equal to the armoured attacker. The aggressor would 
be tied up by small groups equipped with the new defence 
technology.34 
Neither of the above approaches was accepted as the final 
solution. The discussion of options did nevertheless suggest ways 
in which the new arms technology could be exploited to improve 
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Forward Defence. Modern weaponry could remove some of the 
inherent weaknesses of infantry and enable the forces to be used 
more effectively. At the same time, existing doctrine could be 
interpreted more flexibly. 
In a way, all of the options discussed were contained in the 
new Allied Army Doctrine of 1981, in which the Central Region 
was divided into covering force, main battle and rear areas. 
NATO member states employed their own battle doctrines in 
their respective zones. Dutch, Belgian and, to some extent, British 
forces had adopted modified versions of area defence. The 
Germans and, again to some extent, the British planned to fight 
with mobile armoured forces. The Americans, who were moving 
towards an offensive AirLand Battle concept, would exploit the 
latest technology. Such differences in approach, it was feared, 
created a certain instability within NATO.35 
Follow On Forces Attack 
In 1982, NATO's then commander Bernard Rogers began to 
promote a kind of European version of the AirLand Battle 
doctrine. The defensive nature of NATO, along with problems of 
incompatibility of the different national forces, prevented a direct 
adoption of the American version. Central to the European 
doctrine was stopping, paralyzing and destroying the second 
echelon of the aggressor before it reached the main combat area. 
This Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) concept, as it was called, 
was initially based on purely conventional technology, but it 
soon became clear that the role of nuclear weapons, as the severest 
form of punishment and deterrence, could not simply be 
relinquished. Thus, a delayed deployment of nuclear weapons 
became the new policy. The doctrine was accepted as the basis 
for NATO planning on 9 November 1984.36 
Actions in two major directions were taken under 
consideration in drawing up the conventional battle doctrine: (1) 
paralyzing or destroying the advancing second echelon troops of 
the Warsaw Pact and (2) dealing with its massive air strike 
capability. If these tasks could be carried through, then deep 
enemy strikes to the rear and attempts to concentrate 
overwhelming forces in the main combat area would be rendered 
c 
ineffective. In the same fashion, it was thought possible to prevent 
the new OMGs from joining the battle. Ways of repelling the 
aggressor's first echelon were discussed as well. 
The organizational and technological improvements to the 
Warsaw Pact air forces received close attention in the drafting of 
the new NATO battle doctrines. Planes and helicopters were 
regarded as critical to the success of the opponent's doctrine and 
their use had therefore to be prevented. The fear was that aircraft 
from some 30 to 40 main bases might support the operations of 
the ground forces, with disastrous effects on the NATO air forces 
and rear.37 In the early 1980s the only non-nuclear way of hitting 
these bases was by manned aircraft. 
Long- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles equipped with 
conventional warheads could, it was thought, offer a new way of 
destroying the enemy air bases and forcing the remaining aircraft 
onto secondary airfields with poorer air defences. These back-up 
airfields would then be destroyed in a second phase with areal 
effect weapons of fighter aircraft. Evidently the development of 
ballistic missiles for this particular purpose was soon abandoned 
and, instead, the U.S. Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS) 
and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) projects provided 
solutions for shorter ranges. Intermediate-range cruise missiles 
carrying submunitions could conceivably be employed to destroy 
the main airfields. There is no information to suggest that 
submunitions were used against airfields in the Gulf War, 
however. 
Interdiction of the battlefield is probably the most difficult 
air force operation, calling as it does for penetrating through 
ever thickening air defences, locating the target in difficult 
circumstances and finally performing the attack. Indeed, it has 
been necessary to find a more reliable alternative. One such 
alternative was to stop the opponent's second echelon with much 
the same weaponry as used to destroy the bases, and to prevent 
follow-on echelons from reaching the main battlefield through 
missile strikes at choke points, bridges and railway intersections 
along the approach route. The disarrayed troops could then be 
destroyed or paralyzed by artillery and air-to-ground attacks. 
The advances in electronic warfare have been decisive for 
aerial operations aimed at disabling air defences. Effective 
electronic surveillance, interference and deception are 
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prerequisites for the successful execution of the aerial component 
of FOFA doctrine. 
The new tactical missiles would have allowed NATO to 
repel the first echelon as well, even before it reached the forward 
lines of defence. This type of operation would be carried out in 
two phases: air-launched precision weapons relying on sensors, 
targeting technology and sophisticated information processing 
equipment would be employed 100-300 kilometres in front of the 
forward edge of the battlefield (FEBA), while ground-fired 
precision missiles having a range of 30-100 kilometres would 
paralyze enemy forces in the immediate vicinity of the main 
combat area. In principle, these two tasks could be performed 
with different versions of the same system.38 
Munitions exploiting new homing technology at the end of 
their trajectory would be deployed against enemy troops engaging 
NATO forces. Multiple launched rocket systems (MLRS), mortars 
or artillery could be used as launchers. It has been estimated that, 
equipped with submunitions, the 12 missiles of a MLRS would 
have the effect of a one-kiloton nuclear charge but at one fifth of 
the cost.39 
The development of the antitank missile was presumed to 
give the defender a clear edge over the aggressor. Helicopters 
equipped with antitank missiles would be used to paralyze any 
small tank formations breaking through the line of defence. 
The target surveillance and command system developed in 
the early 1980s was not adequate for destroying targets deep 
inside the enemy rear. Now, however, newly deployed systems 
such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS) and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) are supporting 
the concepts relying on new arms technology. At the same time, 
command models that once depended on the human factor are 
changing, incorporating more technology and becoming more 
automated. Rapid communications provide the military 
leadership with up-to-date information regarding the battle 
situation, and the delay in directing troops is reduced. Indeed, 
the new doctrines stress speed and surprise. 
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Other doctrinal consequences 
So far we have examined the direct effects of arms technology on 
NATO battle doctrines. The described advances in arms 
technology also had consequences for strategic doctrine. The 
combination of the Rogers (FOFA) doctrine with Forward Defence 
gave Flexible Response more credibility and added to its deterrent 
value. 
The most important new element was the capability to carry 
out a missile strike against the opponent's supply lines deep 
inside its territory. Aircraft would then be freed for less dangerous 
operations than flying deep inside Warsaw Pact territory. 
Advances in the weaponry of both sides influenced the 
structuring of tasks in the Forward Defence. In order of 
importance these tasks were: 
— aerial counter activity 
— interdiction of the battlefield 
— attack against the echeloned and mobile ground troops 
following after the first wave 
— dealing with massive tank invasions." 
Repelling the initial attack, previously viewed as the primary 
task, had thus lost some of its importance. 
It was widely believed that improvements in the direct 
defence capability, by delaying the opponent and allowing time 
for decision making, would slow the escalation towards a nuclear 
counter-attack.41 The nuclear threshold would rise as the capability 
to wage conventional war improved. As long as the threat of at 
least strategic missiles loomed in the background, deterrence 
would remain strong, preventing a surprise attack. The function 
of nuclear weapons, therefore, was to maintain risk and 
deterrence. The gap between projected and existing technology 
remained great, however. The most optimistic doctrinal concepts 
would have seen a practical realization only in the distant future. 
Against all this, some analysts argued that advances in 
conventional weaponry would not necessarily have raised the 
nuclear threshold; they might have done just the reverse." 
The discussions about the new battle doctrine also addressed 
the protection of NATO's flanks, whose strategic significance 
increased during the 1980s, at least in American planning. New 
technology strengthened the effectiveness of the alliance 
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reinforcing system. With the improvements in firepower and 
aerial and naval mobility, reinforcements could be dispatched 
quickly, even to remote locations such as northern Norway. The 
use of missiles in central Europe would free more of the newest 
aerial technology to the north where an all-weather and dark 
flying capability is required during most of the year. The Danish 
straits could be defended by conventional missiles. In the same 
way, battles for the southern flank would be influenced by the 
new arms technology. 
The capability to open a new front depends on adequate 
infantry units and support from other branches early in the 
battle. As lighter air- and sea-transportable technology became 
available, the time required to move troops and initiate hostilities 
shortened substantially. Today, these forms of transport are 
capable of moving armoured fighting vehicles and light combat 
tanks. As well, small calibre artillery can be transported with 
infantry troops. Portable antitank weapons and missiles allow a 
quick antitank response. Missiles play a significant role in air 
defences. Air forces, capable of ranging over great distances, 
provide effective fire support and air cover. Helicopters can 
operate from either ships or land bases, and their logistics support 
facilities can quickly be established at temporary helicopter bases 
at battlefield bridgeheads. The new arms technology substantially 
increases NATO's ability to expand the area of war. 
Developments during the late 1980s. 
By the mid-1980s, there was general agreement in Western Europe 
that the basic military doctrines of the two alliances were solid. 
The Warsaw Pact's offensive and NATO's flexible response 
doctrines had not changed and were not expected to change 
significantly in the future. Many individual aspects of the strategy 
became reinforced in response to the emergence of new weapons. 
Battle doctrines, on the other hand, became increasingly offensive 
in nature. Possible deployment of Operational Manoeuver Groups 
(OMGs) by the Warsaw Pact was perceived as a logical extension 
of existing technology. The methods of deploying new weapons 
by the Western alliance were a response to technological and 
doctrinal developments on the other side and the criticism of the 
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alliance's earlier shortcomings. 
In both alliances, doctrine was reshaped in response to the 
technological advances of the other side. This took place along 
two paths: first, counter-weapons were developed as fast and as 
far as the prevailing technology would allow, and second, the 
enemy's methods of using its new weapons and the consequences 
of this for enemy doctrine were carefully evaluated. Doctrine 
was then modified, taking into account the characteristics of the 
new counter-weapons and the results of the evaluation. Although 
the practical foundation for the change in doctrine was the new 
technology, many of the other factors influencing doctrine were, 
of course, at work as well. 
Technological developments caused the following features 
to become central to the doctrines of both alliances: 
— expansion of the battle area in depth and in width 
— emphasis on combined-arms operations 
— aerial operations and the increased importance of helicopter 
and tactical aircraft support for ground forces 
— increased emphasis on offensive operations 
— re-organization of forces to accord with new arms technology 
— increased emphasis on mobility and the element of surprise, 
and 
— increased flexibility in operations. 
Conventional technology could not replace nuclear weapons 
as the fundamental element of deterrence. As a result of 
technological improvements, however, many tasks that formerly 
were assigned to tactical nuclear weapons were now assigned to 
conventional weapons. The Warsaw Pact's expanded range of 
nuclear weapons suggested that it was technically more prepared 
for a nuclear war. For both alliances, the range of choices for the 
battle area expanded. Both alliances now had the capability to 
choose the degree of their nuclear retaliation. The heightened 
risk of escalation began to act as a constraint against the use of 
nuclear weapons, and against war in general. 
It was commonly believed in the late 1980s that both alliances 
would increase their deployment of new arms technology in the 
future. The Soviet deficiencies in high technology would be 
compensated for by their ability to mass produce reliable and 
relatively modern weapons. Western mass production of high-
tech weaponry would continue to be held back by the staggering 
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cost and the unwillingness of NATO member nations to commit 
scarce economic resources to developing the military sector. 
The dramatic changes that took place at the end of the 
decade were especially surprising to analysts who had predicted 
the maintenance of the status quo. The threat of attack, against 
which the Western doctrine had been designed, began to dissipate 
rapidly. German unification, collapse of the Warsaw Pact and 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from central Europe created a 
friendly no-man's-land — Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Belarus and Ukraine — between the Forward Defence and the 
traditional threat. The idea of strong forward presence lost its 
meaning. It was no longer conceivable that a surprise attack 
would soon be followed by a destructive second echelon. The 
threats against Western Europe now came from a different 
direction, and even the validity of FOFA needed to be 
reconsidered. 
NATO decided upon its new strategic concept at the Rome 
Conference of November 1991.43 The significant points were 
mapping out the threats from different geographical directions, 
without knowing their exact nature or degree; a shift from military 
defence towards cooperation and coordinated security issues; 
increasing the multinationality of the defence arrangements of 
member nations; force reductions; and altering the areas of 
responsibility. It was also significant that the United States 
committed itself to reducing the number of its European forces 
to 150,00044 or even less by 1995. 
The nature of NATO battle doctrine is not yet known, but 
the strategic concept is a renewed version of Flexible Response 
that calls for flexibility in previously unforeseen ways. Forward 
Defence becomes Forward Presence inside German territory, and 
the number of troops at the alliance's former Eastern border will 
be reduced. It can be expected that the main concepts of FOFA 
will remain useful in the new battle doctrine, but penetration of 
an aggressor into alliance territory might require an intense 
AirLand Battle-type counter-offensive from troops not entirely 
prepared for it under the old system. 
In the face of the new arms technology, the massed use of 
forces has lost its meaning. Use of Rapid Reaction Corps in 
different parts of the Allied area requires increased harmonization 
of troops and weapons such as provided for in the Treaty Limited 
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Equipment (TLE) part of the CFE agreement. Harmonization of 
troops and getting used to the enlarged operating areas will take 
some time. Thus battle doctrine cannot immediately respond to 
the new challenges. Overall, however, present arms technology 
even today supports the execution of the new battle doctrine. By 
way of conclusion it can be said that the role of political and 
geopolitical and thence also economic factors in shaping doctrines 
has increased, while the role of technology has decreased. 
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5 ARMS TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
DEFENCE DOCTRINES OF NEUTRAL 
COUNTRIES 
5.1 Arms technology and Finnish military doctrine 
The Finnish defence doctrine is based on the functions of the 
defence forces prescribed by law and the principle of area defence 
that became policy in 1966. Policies have been formulated in 
decisions concerning the objectives, grounds, specific tasks and 
practical execution of military activities and how these relate to 
other aspects of national defence.41 The doctrine has been made 
public in the communiques of Parliamentary Defence Committees, 
a 1986 statement of the Defence Council and the directives and 
manuals of the defence forces. A specific written summary of 
military doctrine did not exist before the CSCE doctrinal seminars 
of 1990 and 1991. 
Finnish military policy, which has not undergone significant 
change since the 1960s, can be described in terms of strategic 
defence and an area defence system. Advances in arms technology 
have mainly been reflected in changes in descriptions of the 
battlefield, and to some extent in a reassessment of the importance 
of the various service branches and weapons systems. 
The underlying objective of Finnish policy has been to secure 
the independence and well-being of citizens by maintaining a 
level of defence capability that would prevent the country from 
being drawn into a conflict. Finland has attempted to create an 
overall defence system that is resilient and effective and capable 
of inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor. If necessary 
the country must be capable of repelling an attack in order to buy 
time for political manoeuvring. Despite the advances in arms 
technology, this doctrine of relative deterrence has proven to be 
durable in nature and the overall defence system to be a suitable 
approach amenable to further development.' 
In accordance with her neutrality, Finland defines the threat 
against her in such a way that the possible aggressor is not 
named. There has been little reason to change this practice since 
the 1960s. Military activities would presumably be the result of a 
larger European conflict in which Finnish territory was threatened 
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by outside exploitation or transit. Although the new situation in 
Europe in the early nineties has altered the nature of the threat, 
Finns are awaiting a clarification of the European security 
architecture and the situation in Russia before altering their 
military doctrine or defence policy. 
Implicit in Finland's concept of territorial defence is that 
resistance begins at the country's borders. The defence wears the 
aggressor down by using weaponry and the size of the territory 
to its advantage. The enemy is denied access to critical areas by 
halting its attacks in areas of terrain advantageous to the defence. 
The enemy will be beaten back by the counterattacks of reserves. 
Local defence and guerilla activities are important on the flanks 
and in the rear of the invader. The army, which is responsible for 
most of the fighting, is supported by the air force and the navy.47 
Although Finnish doctrine has remained essentially the same, 
some modifications have been made in response to the new arms 
technology. 
The attitude towards nuclear weapons has not changed 
significantly. Although the continued evolution of nuclear 
weapons, in combination with doctrinal changes, was thought to 
increase the chances of the weapons being used, the likehood of 
anyone ever using them against Finland was considered small. 
More recently, the credibility of nuclear weapons has dissipated. 
Protecting the population from the consequences of a nuclear 
accident or of a nuclear war elsewhere is the task of the civil 
defence. Ground troops are trained to operate in areas that have 
been contaminated by weapons of mass destruction. The mainly 
political threat of nuclear cruise missiles has been met by 
intensifying air defences along the anticipated flight paths, 
especially in north. Finland never considered nuclear weapons 
necessary for itself, not even in the 1960s when the matter was 
under consideration in Switzerland and Sweden. 
Changes in the air forces of the superpowers required the 
army manual description of the battlefield to be rewritten. The 
increased threat of airborne attacks encouraged the large-scale 
development of an air defence network for the protection of 
troops and critical installations. As an important strategic region, 
Lapland, even in time of peace, has a well-equipped air wing and 
air defence unit. The heightened military-political importance of 
the Baltic Sea area was one reason for locating a fighter wing at 
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the Pirkkala base near Tampere. The protection of Helsinki, the 
country's capital and economic hub, with defensive long-range 
missiles reflects the increased threat of a surprise aerial attack. 
The purchase of medium-range surface-to-air missiles is further 
evidence of the greater importance attached to air defences. It 
can be stated that the procurement of new arms technology 
ensures the effectiveness of the doctrine in the face of new enemy 
weapons. Command and control systems have been improved 
so that the air battle command covers the entire country. Finland 
is acquiring new fighter aircraft and special attention is being 
given to optimizing the speed and flexibility of their operation in 
strategic areas. 
Advances in landing craft technology encouraged a 
modernization of the Navy and Coastal Artillery during the 
1970s and 1980s. When it was discovered that the Navy was only 
able to defend the Finnish territorial waters around the northern 
Baltic Sea or the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, and not both, new 
missile boats were procured and coastal defence systems 
improved. The myriad islands and treacherous waters off the 
Finnish coast make minelaying a significant part of coastal 
defence. New, domestic technology in this area has facilitated 
the realization of an earlier operational concept. The objective of 
the Navy modernization programme has been to keep the 
performance level in line with the threat. The focal points in the 
development of naval defences have been the prevention of 
territorial violations and improved underwater surveillance. 
Lapland and southern Finland are the two most important 
strategic areas. The significance of Lapland has been heightened 
by the development of Soviet nuclear submarines and the Soviet 
Northern Fleet with its air force, and by the NATO systems 
serving military purposes in Northern Norway. In the south, the 
coastal area has assumed more importance with the increase in 
naval and air force activity around the Baltic Sea. The improved 
mobility of the opponent, it is thought, facilitates its taking 
advantage of these two strategic areas. Finland's goal has therefore 
been to develop the capability to deploy her forces flexibly 
throughout the country. This has been done in two ways: a 
strong peacetime brigade has been permanently stationed in 
Lapland, and the mobility of forces intended to man strategically 
important areas has been improved by equipping them with 
tracked infantry vehicles and armoured personal carriers. 
Development of the army to correspond with doctrine has 
been difficult. During the past decades, improved mobility of the 
opponent, enlargement of the battle area, increased firepower 
and better armoured protection posed new challenges for the 
defence system, and the principles of troop employment had to 
be re-evaluated. Fighting units were divided into two distinct 
categories: fast deployment and main forces. For economic 
reasons, it was necessary to focus on critical areas. Great 
improvements were made in the mobility, firepower, anti-air 
and antitank weaponry, and armoured protection of the fast 
deployment troops, whose task is to buy time by wearing down 
and slowing the invader. Owing to lack of resources, it has not 
been possible to equip the main force to the same degree. 
Consequently, their task would be to stop the invader and stabilize 
the situation. Driving the opponent out of Finnish territory would 
require units that possess more mobility, firepower and armoured 
protection than those at present do. The goal for the nineties is to 
equip the major troops in keeping with the changes that have 
taken place at the battlefield level. Battle readiness will be 
improved by emphasizing mobile operations and flexibility, 
which are inherent parts of active defence. The greater threat of 
attacks to the rear increases the importance of local defence. 
Unfortunately, there have not been adequate resources to 
modernize the forces designated for this task. 
The increased threat of a surprise attack and greater scope 
for territorial violations created by the new technology has put 
added pressure on national defence even in time of peace. The 
ability to manage lower levels of crisis than war has become an 
important consideration in setting the criteria for the Finnish 
defence capability. Special attention has been paid to the 
deployment of reconnaissance and guerrilla units and to terrorist 
activities in other states. Preparing a resistance to these activities 
and protecting of important installations are now central tasks of 
the local defence. Indeed, the developments described above led 
to a re-evaluation of operational principles. The present objectives 
are to be able to take care of peacetime surveillance tasks and 
flexibly to mobilize fighting forces in response to any threat that 
may jeopardize Finnish security. The goal is to maintain the 
capability to repel a limited conventional attack. 
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5.2 Finland and a changing Europe in the 1990s 
Although Europe has undergone dramatic change and the 
doctrines of many countries have been altered, Finland has not 
significantly modified its strategic policies. From the Finnish 
perspective, the Nordic military and political environment, which 
for a long time was stable, has even become more uncertain. At 
the same time, the end to political bipolarism and the lessening 
of tensions between the two superpowers have been witnessed 
with relief. Uncertainty about the future nevertheless forbids 
any relaxing of national defence. The doctrine and the way it is 
being executed continue to fulfill the requirements of military 
security and appear to satisfy the expectations of Finland's 
immediate neighbours as well as members of the European 
Community. 
Minor changes will be made in the execution of the defence 
policy, especially at the administrative and operative levels. These, 
however, are mainly a response to limited economic resources 
and the need to improve efficiency. A new command and 
administration system will come into being at the beginning of 
1993, rationalizing the defence system by removing overlapping 
units and unnecessary layers of command. The country will be 
divided into three national defence regions, each with command 
of its own service branches. The military districts commanding 
peacetime forces will be subordinate to the regions. 
The current modernization of the army Jaeger and Armoured 
Brigades is the natural continuation of earlier reorganization and 
rearming, responding to the new conventional weaponry of the 
opponent. The modernization is aimed at increasing mobility, 
firepower and protection. With the shortage of resources, optimal 
development is not possible. Detailed planning and exploiting of 
the special features of Finnish terrain are, therefore, crucial to the 
development of battle doctrine. 
Aging of Finland's existing fighters has necessitated a speedy 
modernization of the air force. An agreement has been signed to 
acquire fifty-seven modern interceptors and seven training aircraft 
(F/A 18) by the end of the decade. The air force modernization 
programme shows that airspace has maintained its place as an 
important part of doctrine. In both the air force and navy 
modernization programmes, the effort has been made to find the 
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most practical solutions in arms technology - a task not made 
easier by the present pressure on resources. The internal 
organizational changes in Baltic navies, combined with 
foreseeable military and political changes around the Baltic Sea, 
are likely to decrease the importance of the navy in the short run. 
Pressures to maintain a viable domestic shipbuilding industry, 
on the other hand, argue for the continued existence of the navy 
component. 
In a recent statement, Admiral Jan Klenberg48 listed the 
military threats against Finland in the following order: (1) a 
surprise attack to subjugate the state, (2) an offensive against a 
third party through Finnish territory, and (3) a large-scale attack 
to invade the country. To some extent this order is reflected in 
the development of the different sectors of national defence. The 
overall goal, nevertheless, is the capability to repel all three kinds 
of threats and contingency plans responding to all three scenarios 
are constantly under development. 
5.3 Changes in Swedish threat perceptions and doctrine 
in the 1980s. 
The Swedish analyst Wilhelm Agrell emphasizes that threat is a 
significant part of doctrine.49 The implication of an opponent's 
technological advances can, to some degree, be concluded from 
changes in the perceived threat. In the case of Sweden, the main 
factors persuading such changes have been an increase in the 
operating range of Great Power forces and in mobility and speed 
on the ground, at sea and in the air. The following fields of 
technology have been especially important: 
- optronics and information processing technology used in 
surveillance and precision weapons, 
- electronics and information processing systems used in military 
communication, electronic warfare and guidance systems, 
- technology that increases the firepower and effectiveness of 
weapons, 
- ground and air transportation technology that facilitates 
increased protection, mobility and capacity so 
The implications of nuclear weapons for the battlefield and 
the rear were widely studied in Sweden in the 1960s. Even the 
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acquisition of a Swedish nuclear deterrence was discussed. Since 
then the Swedes have been content with protecting their military 
and civilian populations from nuclear attack and from fallout 
that may originate outside the country. 
The longer range of tactical aircraft and the deployment of 
long-range cruise missiles in the 1980s posed a growing threat to 
Swedish airspace. At about the same time, both alliances 
developed a more pressing need to acquire forward bases and 
air surveillance facilities in Swedish territory. The widespread 
deployment of helicopters increased the risk of airborne attacks." 
Aware of the increasing number of crises and armed conflicts, 
by the mid-1980s the Swedes began to feel a degree of 
3uncertainty. Territorial violations and new types of threats 
seemed probable. In each case, advances in arms technology 
were mentioned as contributory. 
Prior to the 1980s, Swedish doctrine was rigidly defensive. 
Potential invaders were to be stopped as far from the border as 
possible. Technological superiority of the Great Powers, combined 
with Sweden's limited resources to develop its military forces, 
compelled a change in doctrine. By the early 1990s the new 
doctrine required that the attacker be prevented from obtaining 
a solid foothold on Swedish territory and quickly using it for his 
own purposes. The defence capability was to be maintained not 
only at the borders and along the coast but in the interior of the 
country as well. The battle was to begin at the borders, flex 
regionally and, where possible, the invader was to be pushed 
back, or at least hindered from reaching his operational goals. 
The principles guiding development that had been 
announced in 1982 remained in place until the end of the decade. 
A process of rationalization was begun with the creation of more 
effective forces relying on new technology. Units and weapons 
systems were to be improved without change in the basic 
composition of the military. As the chances of a surprise attack 
were perceived to be increasing, special attention was paid to 
readiness and to mobilization arrangements. 
Development of the army proceeded with a view to the 
increased threat from the air and need for a defence against fast 
moving ground forces. Fighting capability, firepower (especially 
antitank capability) and mobility were the focal points of attention. 
An apparent doctrinal inconsistency began to generate discussion: 
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Was the objective to drive the invader out or merely to hinder his 
operation? The former was declared as the main policy, but the 
latter was considered to be a definite option should the situation 
become unmanageable. Since the threat of an air mobile attack 
remained great it was recommended that the forces should be 
dispersed throughout the country. A model of a counterattack 
by small units over a wide area was included in the army battle 
manual. This approach was adopted not only for the 
aforementioned reasons but to prevent the opponent from 
concentrating its forces against Swedish forces that might be in 
the process of preparing a decisive strike. The model called for 
the use of small, efficient units to splinter the invader's forces 
and destroy them piece by piece. The invader would be tied up 
by fire in areas where it was superior. The doctrine specifically 
emphasized the need for a large number of units. The defence of 
key installations was stressed in view of the increased threat 
from air mobile attacks and sabotage activities. Less well-
equipped brigades were to be used along with new and better 
equipped local units for this purpose. Large mobile reserve forces 
were regarded as necessary to move the focus of action according 
to the threat.52 
Advances in technology were also perceived to improve the 
Swedish ability to defend. Accurate, long-range weapons could 
be scattered and hidden from the enemy and their fire 
concentrated on selected critical targets. This offered a new lease 
on life to the somewhat old-fashioned armoured brigades. Indirect 
antitank activity, mines and mechanization were seen as factors 
strengthening Swedish operations. The use of antitank helicopters 
was incorporated into army tactics. The ability to counterattack 
in a variety of circumstances was considered important. 
Air defences were updated by improving the mobility, 
operational speed, diversity and flexibility of systems. The greater 
threat from the air made the air force more important to national 
defence. Modern, domestically produced aircraft were considered 
a safeguard of the defence policy. Lightweight, portable air 
defence missile systems were needed in great numbers to counter 
the helicopter threat. These would be used in the rear of the 
invader as well. 
The limited availability of new weaponry was reflected in 
the strategic doctrine. Faced with the U.S ban on high technology 
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exports, Sweden had to rely on its own resources. Indeed, Sweden 
intends to maintain its arms industry, continue research and 
increase cooperation with other, mainly neutral, countries. At 
the same time, Swedish defence is changing from being a purely 
military matter to one involving other branches of administration 
as well. The new threats to communications systems posed by 
advances in enemy arms technology encouraged Sweden to 
develop command systems for crucial civilian fields and to ensure 
the crisis-time operation of the central command system. 
5.4 Swedish defence policy in transition 
The radical changes taking place in Europe in 1990 created 
confusion in Swedish defence policy. The commander of the 
armed forces wanted to continue equipping the forces more or 
less in the manner described above. During the hearings of the 
Parliamentary Defence Committee, however, some political 
factions, Social Democrats in particular, criticized security and 
political assessments and defence planning in general. Concluding 
that the earlier threat no longer existed, they called for cutbacks 
in the armed forces. The willingness to allocate resources for 
defence purposes diminished and a new "nucleus"-model began 
to take shape: only a nucleus force should be equipped with 
modern, expensive equipment, while the size of the mobilized 
wartime forces should be drastically reduced. The Committee 
could not reach a consensus, with the result that the 1991 Defence 
Decision was delayed.53  
Just recently, a decision was reached to begin planning of 
cuts. During 1992, Parliament will consider a proposal that would 
close fifteen bases and cut personnel by as much as 25%. The 
number of brigades would drop to under twenty, of which only 
ten would receive modern equipment. Invasion of the whole 
country is no longer perceived to be a threat. The defence forces, 
now reduced in size, are to be able to repel a surprise attack on 
short notice. Providing it could be used flexibly in different parts 
of the country, a smaller, crisis management force would be 
adequate.54 Present arms technology is seen to allow the creation 
of more effective forces and ensure their rapid movement from 
place to place according to the threat. 
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The threat from the air remains great. The commander of 
the armed forces has warned of the weaknesses of the air defences. 
Although the number of aircraft is being decreased, the Swedes 
are striving to employ modern, domestically manufactured, 
equipment. The development of a new fighter is a prime example 
of this. Indeed, the overall goal is to become as self-sufficient as 
possible in military hardware.55 Other considerations besides 
defence needs, employment in particular, have influenced this 
decision. 
5.5 Swiss doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s 
In 1973 a new security policy and a comprehensive defence plan 
were made public in Switzerland.-" The strategic defence doctrine 
was based on a "two-component" model providing for (1) general 
peacekeeping and crisis management and (2) military and civilian 
defence aimed at achieving "Peace in Freedom". The tasks of the 
military defence were to prevent war by maintaining a defence 
readiness, repelling attacks against Swiss territory and assisting 
civilian authorities. 
The principles of the doctrine were inspired by historical 
experience, and the operational practices drew, among other 
things, on World War II troop positions. The militia was to 
engage the enemy at the borders and the battle was to be fought 
in defensive zones that had been mined and fortified during 
peacetime. The opponent should be prevented from achieving 
its operational goals and at least the vital parts of the country 
should be kept in Swiss hands. 
The importance of crisis management was stressed in the 
early 1980s. The modern weaponry of the two major alliances 
surrounded the country and posed various levels of threat, 
ranging from mild tension to outright invasion. Within the context 
of total defence, peace should be guaranteed by preventing, with 
appropriately scaled measures, the tendency to escalation. 
Defence contingency plans were developed, in response to various 
threat scenarios identified in an analysis of possible situations. 
The increased threat of a surprise attack suggested the need to 
improve the already existing capability for rapid mobilization. 
Special readiness forces were formed to fight the battles of the 
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first few hours." 
The strategy took into account the modern equipment of the 
potential aggressor. Battle would be fought primarily against 
mechanized troops supported by strong aerial and artillery fire. 
Increase in the firepower demanded more attention to 
fortifications. Enemy ground and air mobility was to be countered 
by deep formations exploiting the fortifications and terrain. It 
was assumed that, with the increased pace of modern warfare, 
some areas of the country would be lost. The Swiss were thus 
prepared to continue the battle by guerrilla tactics. Use by the 
enemy of its most effective weapons was to be hindered by 
conducting operations among its formations. Deep enemy strikes 
were to be met by tank and air force counterattacks. Requests 
were made for new antitank technology and more of the antitank 
weapons already in use. Regardless of the opponent's arms 
technology the Swiss considered that the small size of the country 
and psychological factors left them no alternative but to engage 
the enemy at the borders and to carry the battle throughout the 
country. 
The advances in air power elsewhere demanded a 
strengthening of the air defences, which long had occupied a 
prominent place in Swiss doctrine. The task of the Swiss air force 
was to prevent the enemy from achieving air superiority and to 
minimize the effects of any attack on Swiss ground troops. The 
air force would play the key role in moving over from normal 
conditions to defence. A further task was to lend fire support to 
the army. Attention was also given to improvements in airspace 
surveillance, the early warning system and ground troop air 
defences. 
The acquisition of nuclear weapons was still under 
consideration in the mid-1960s. Although the idea was eventually 
abandoned, the nuclear threat was recognized in military doctrine. 
The area where the two alliances met in common borders was 
believed to be a likely location for the use of nuclear weapons. 
Recognizing the swiftness of modern warfare, the possibility 
of surprise attacks and the advances in electronic warfare, the 
Swiss have taken pains to ensure the protection of their command 
systems. Switzerland is in the process of installing a new 
communications system, which, to satisfy the exceptionally high 
quality requirements, had to be developed domestically. 
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Domestic arms production plays an important part in Swiss 
defence thinking. Essential equipment must be available even 
were the country to be rapidly surrounded. Advances in arms 
technology outside the country have been responded to by the 
acquisition of counter weapons and by training troops in the use 
of these. 
5.6 Principles of the new Swiss security policy 
The recent changes in countries nearby and in Europe in general 
have necessitated a re-evaluation of Swiss security policy. On 1 
October 1990 the Swiss government released an interim report 
on the new policy.58 Another significant doctrinal assessment is 
the defence forces reform, "Armeereform 95". 
The 1990 report lists the goals of the new security policy as 
follows: 
— maintenance of peace while free and independent 
— maintenance of freedom of action 
— protection of citizens and their basic rights, 
— territorial integrity, and 
— the promotion of international stability especially in Europe. 
Protecting the basic rights of Swiss citizens and the promotion 
of international stability are new emphases.59 
The restatement of policy indicates a change in threat 
perception, a change influenced, among other things, by advances 
in arms technology. New security and political tasks have been 
assigned to the defence forces. The Swiss emphasize, however, 
that they by no means intend to weaken their traditional defence. 
Troop levels are to be cut by approximately one third, but 
the remaining troops will be equipped and trained to deal with a 
wider range of threats and new tasks. These new tasks may 
include taking part in U.N. peacekeeping operations, providing 
aid to East European countries in the form of training and know-
how, providing security arrangements for conferences and 
assisting in the verification of international agreements. Since it 
would be next to impossible to assess the implications of new 
arms technology in these fields, the Swiss defence reforms should 
mainly be seen as improving the traditional defence capability." 
The acquisition of new fighter aircraft suggests that 
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development of the air arm will continue. The decision to acquire 
F-18 fighters has been finalized. Though the number of planes is 
small, the purchase is an indicator of the importance conceded to 
air power even at a time when the region of potential East - West 
confrontation has shifted away from Switzerland. 
5.7 Austrian doctrinal thinking 
Much like Switzerland, but already back in 1965, Austria identified 
several different threat scenarios: 
— a crisis situation, in which international tensions rise and the 
risk of conflict increases, 
— a neutrality situation, in which neigbouring countries are at 
war, 
— a defence situation, in which Austria is under attack.b' 
The value of this sort of contingency analysis grew as arms 
technology evolved. The assessment that the aggressor would 
seek surprise and implement combined-arms operations of 
overwhelming air and ground forces was shown to be correct; 
for both alliances began to deploy weaponry that would allow 
them to engage in just such operations. 
In view of the increased offensive capability of both 
superpowers, area defence was chosen as the strategic concept. 
In the development of the doctrine, a solution was sought to a 
situation in which the aggressor attempted swiftly to take 
important areas even in the interior. Area defence has been 
executed by the selection of easily defendable key zones whose 
access roads could be blocked. Key areas within the zones have 
been fortified to ensure that the zones are held. Lands between 
the zones are regarded as security areas and would be used 
primarily to secure operations. The enemy would be engaged 
only lightly in these areas. 
The increased threats of surprise attack and outside 
intervention that Austria felt in the 1980s encouraged her closer 
attention to mobilization, defence readiness and troop 
composition. Readiness forces that would be in constant alert 
mode were created to respond quickly to any crisis situation. The 
forces were to be equipped with modern weapons. The main 
battle tanks in particular are very modern, and steps have been 
taken toward their production within Austria. The 
characteristically large battlefields of modern warfare make it 
important to tie up the enemy on his flanks and in the rear. Local 
forces, which would sometimes be used in guerrilla-like 
operations, were created for this specific purpose. However, 
emphasis is now shifting towards the conventional style of battle. 
Developments in the air forces of the Great Powers have 
had several implications. Clearly, movements and counter-attacks 
involving large troop formations were to be avoided in the event 
of an attack. Originally a response to new arms technology, this 
policy found a natural reinforcement in geographical factors. Air 
defences have been improved, despite a clause in the State Treaty 
imposing limits on such activities. A sophisticated radar network 
has been constructed for the surveillance of Austrian airspace 
and a number of interceptors have been acquired. Helicopters 
are of considerable importance, given the nature of the terrain 
and the pace of modern warfare, and Austria has acquired about 
a hundred helicopters. Resources have also been allocated to 
improving the air defences of troops. 
Austria's position on nuclear weapons is the same as that of 
the other neutral countries. The threat posed by cruise missiles, 
however, has generated a different response. The missile ban 
imposed on Austria was considered to reduce her responsibility 
for airspace and, as a result, defences against cruise missile have 
not received any funding. 
As in Switzerland, the efficiency of the command system 
and assuring the ability to mobilize received close attention. 
Advances in arms technology were considered often to place the 
defence capabilities of small nations in doubt. Austria responded 
to the challenge by increasing the number of her troops and by 
equipping and training them in accordance with the requirements 
of modern warfare. Large-scale, demonstrative military exercises 
were yet another part of the policy. 
In the wake of the changes in Europe, Austria now finds 
herself back-to-back with the eastern European countries. 
Simultaneously, threats from the southeast, from Yugoslavia and 
Hungary, have emerged. Since Austria does not have a frontier 
guard, border tasks have fallen on the shoulders of the 
Bundesheer. Policy-makers would also like the Bundesheer to 
assist in catastrophies at home and abroad, to provide technical 
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assistance at accident sites, to protect citizens in a broader way 
than before and to assist in international tasks of verification, 
observation of manouevres, peacekeeping and military training.62 
The basic defence tasks of the Bundesheer remain as well. 
Although a lessening in the threat posed by new arms technology 
is partly responsible for this broadening of tasks, the main cause 
is political developments. 
Austria has no plans to alter its area defence policy, though 
even the man responsible for it, General Emil Spannocchi, has 
stated that it is no longer necessary to defend the whole area or 
to buy time against the Russians. He has, in fact, proposed 
reductions in the size of the military and suggested that half of 
each age group cohort inducted should be trained as frontier 
guards and environmental protection forces.63 
Despite proposals like these, further development of defences 
is clearly needed. The fact that certain restrictions on Austrian 
military purchases imposed by the two alliances were unilaterally 
nullified on 6 November 1990 confirms that this, indeed, is the 
case. Austria is now able to purchase missiles and aircraft that 
contain German or Japanese parts. In reality Austria had already 
earlier acquired both Draken fighter planes and antitank missiles 
containing parts from these countries, but now such acquisitions 
have juridical status. Evidently defensive surface-to-air missiles 
are also to become a part of the Austrian doctrine. 
5.8 Factors modifying the effects of arms technology 
The threats arising out of advances in arms technology of the 
potential aggressor have not affected the military doctrines of 
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria directly. Other factors, 
as listed in section 2 above, have operated to modify the effect, 
though not in the same way in all countries. 
To compensate for technological deficiency the terrain may 
be exploited to advantage. Finland, for example, has responded 
to the tank threat with plans to fight battles in areas favourable to 
its own troops. Finland does not, in other words, base its defence 
solely on weaponry. In the same way, Switzerland and Austria 
rely on the protection of their mountainous terrain. The 
development of the air forces of the Great Powers has not elicited 
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a full response in the Finnish Doctrine; for poor weather and 
lighting conditions have always argued against air force 
effectiveness. Another factor that tempers the effect of the new 
technology is that the Finns have always felt themselves to be at 
the perimeter of the main European military theatre. Any large-
scale concentration of modern weapons systems against Finland 
has been considered unlikely. 
Of the political factors international treaties have 
considerably influenced doctrinal behaviour. Limitations on the 
type or quantity of weapons a country can acquire have influenced 
the development at least of the Finnish and Austrian air defences. 
Political decisions and an unwillingness to commit resources to 
national defence have affected the development of the fighting 
capability of these countries to the extent that the new threats 
have not had their full effect on doctrines. 
In many cases the cost of the technology that would support 
a particular doctrine becomes the deciding factor. Economic 
resources may be insufficient to effect a particular modernization. 
Likewise, a country's technological level, raw material base, level 
of research and structure of industrial production may work 
against the realization of a particular doctrine. 
Existing troops and the state of their equipment have been 
significant among the military factors. Training has sometimes 
been a problem when the new doctrine required the ability to 
master complex technology. 
5.9 Comparative analysis 
A comparison of the military doctrines of Finland, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Austria shows that none has changed much 
over the years, even though strategic policies and defence 
principles were decided upon long before the newest arms 
technology was developed. The different variants of area defence 
provide a reasonably good response to the threats posed by 
modern technology, and the new weaponry acquired appears to 
reinforce the established policies. Nevertheless, there have been 
shifts in emphasis within doctrines and changes in battle concepts. 
All four neutral countries have responded to the 
development of nuclear weapons in the same way. The population 
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has been prepared for the consequences of them being used 
elsewhere. Although forces have been trained to function under 
nuclear fire the training has not been extensive. The development 
of the cruise missile has been responded to in the form of 
improved air defences. 
Advances in aircraft technology have enhanced the 
importance of the air force, especially in Sweden and Switzerland. 
In Finland and Austria both political and economic factors have 
acted as a restraint. Weapons acquisitions and troop 
reorganizations underline the increased importance of air 
defences. Austria's failure to acquire missiles is mainly attributable 
to political factors. 
Greater aerial mobility has increased the importance of 
readiness to fight on a wide and deep battlefield. The deployment 
of ever more effective troops in the defence of vital installations 
appears to be the trend. Increased mobility of the aggressor has 
necessitated improving the mobility of one's own troops as well. 
Sweden and Finland have improved both the terrain and road 
mobility of the troops that will fight the decisive battles. In 
Austria and Switzerland, the focus of improvements has been 
the mobility of the reserves. The usefulness of helicopters in 
moving troops and firepower has been recognized. It can be 
concluded that even doctrines based on relative deterrence have 
increasingly assumed offensive characteristics. 
The precision and areal weapons of the two alliances have 
been taken note of only in the latest threat scenarios. It seems 
probable that the challenges these weapons pose will be met by 
acquiring limited numbers of counter-weapons and more 
especially by elaborating tactical and operational doctrines for 
declining troop numbers, within the context of present defence 
decisions and emerging security concepts. Increasing flexibility, 
abandonment of rigidly defensive models, strengthening of 
territorial defence especially against terrorist activities and aerial 
attacks, and an effective utilization of crisis management can be 
assumed to be the main trends for the future. The move from an 
absolute capability to defend towards relative defence based on 
unacceptable damage to the aggressor would seem to be 
continuing. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis presented above leads me to conclude that arms 
technology influences military doctrines in two different ways. 
The first is the traditional weapon - counter-weapon response, 
where the enemy's new technology stimulates the development 
of counter-weapons. In this case new technology causes changes 
in the perceived threat and thereby in battle doctrine. The second 
way proceeds through the opponent's doctrine, which changes 
in response to the new arms technology and, in turn, causes the 
other party to adjust its doctrine. In some cases the end result 
will be different from the result that would have been reached in 
the weapon - counter-weapon process. 
All the factors mentioned at the beginning of this report 
(section 2) have influenced the development of doctrines. In 
earlier years, however, weapons and the way they were used 
had a decisive influence on tactical and operations battle doctrines 
and a considerable effect on the development of strategic policies. 
In more recent years it would appear that, on the strategic level, 
political and economic developments and changed security 
assessments, have diminished the weight of arms technology as 
an influencing factor. In the area of battle doctrines, on the other 
hand, arms technology has assumed increasing importance, at 
least for the Great Powers and the two military alliances. 
Economic resources and changes in the political situation 
have determined the direction of recent developments in small 
countries. Where other countries are clearly cutting back on their 
military expenses, however, Sweden and to an extent Finland 
appear to be maintaining their earlier policy. This is largely a 
result of their geopolitical location, historical experiences, the 
continued instability in Russia and questions regarding security 
as a member (or non-member) of the European Community. 
The reductions being made in nuclear arms would appear 
to lessen their deterrent value. Total abandonment of the nuclear 
deterrent is not, however, foreseeable in the near future. On the 
contrary, the idea of deploying nuclear weapons as a deterrent 
appears to have crept into the doctrines of developing nations as 
well. The importance attached to missile defences has increased 
in military doctrines. 
Significant qualitative changes in doctrines include an 
increased flexibility to handle diverse threats, the need to react 
faster and with fewer troops than before and increased width 
and depth of combat areas. New patterns of thought are apparent 
in the more frequent references to international cooperation in 
doctrinal texts, the practical examples of such cooperation in 
actual military and security-political activities and the inclusion 
of new types of security threats as areas of responsibility of the 
armed forces. 
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DOCUMENTATION 
DECISION ON THE NEW AIR FORCE INTERCEPTOR 
The Government has today authorized the Ministry of Defence to sign 
a Letter of Intent with the Government of the United States to purchase 
McDonnell Douglas' F/A-18 aircraft for the Finnish Air Force. The 
procurement consists of 57 single-seaters and 7 trainers. 
In addition, the Government authorized the Ministry of Defence to 
make an offset agreement with McDonnell Douglas Corporation. As a 
prerequisite for the purchase, Parliament has set full offset 
compensations from Finland corresponding to the foreign share. 
The F/A-18 meets in the best way the requirements set on the new 
aircraft when considering performance and costs as well as our national 
requirements. 
The technical and commercial evaluations that have taken almost three 
years included the following types: F-16C/D, F/A-18C/D, JAS 39 
Gripen, Mirage 2000-5 and MiG-29. The suitability of all these aircraft 
was investigated and all candidates were found to be efficient in their 
role. The main differences were due to the acquisition and operating 
costs, the suitability of the aircraft in Finnish conditions according to 
the requirements set by the Air Force, and the security to carry out the 
aircraft development programs and the possibility to maintain the 
performance of the aircraft during its life-cycle of thirty (30) years. 
The costs of the aircraft, first stage maintenance equipment and training 
as well as of the participation of Finnish industry will be covered by the 
granted procurement authorization of 9.5 billion marks. Based on the 
most recent offers, it has also been possible to define the additional 
expenses incurring later by the supplement of the maintenance and 
training system as well as the procurement of weapons. The costs will 
amount to some 3.5 billion marks during 1994-2001. The total 
procurement will thus amount to some 13 billion marks on the 1992 
price level. 
There are plans to sign the actual procurement agreement by mid-June. 
The first aircraft will be delivered in the latter half of 1995 and the last 
deliveries are scheduled for the year 2000. 
Source: Ministry of Defence Bulletin, 6 May 1992 
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FINLAND'S FIGHTER CHOICE 
by Air Force Commander-in-Chief Major General Heikki Nikunen 
The Finnish Air Force's evaluation programme to renew the existing 
interceptor fleet was launched officially in 1989; before that it had, of 
course, been a part of long-term resource planning, and preliminary 
performance criteria had also been studied earlier. 
The evaluation process was very thorough and comprehensive, and it 
was therefore characterized by a particularly tight and demanding 
timescale. The objective for decision-making was set to year 1992, so 
that taking into consideration a normal three years' delivery time, it 
would have been possible to establish a time- and volume-controlled 
renewal scheme effective from the year 1995 - when the first old aircraft 
will leave the service - onwards. 
The evaluation included two test flight periods, the first being arranged 
in the potential delivery countries - where emphasis was placed on 
aircraft performance and flying characteristics -, whilst during the second 
phase, which took place in Finland, capabilities of radar and weapon 
systems against many complex target formations were assessed. 
Reliability, maintainability, training, support, industrial co-operation, 
offset arrangements and all commercial and cost-related questions were 
studied during the evaluation. 
The evaluation and decision-making schedule was adhered to as planned 
at all levels, which enabled the Government to make a decision to 
authorize the Ministry of Defence to acquire 57 single-seat and 7 two-
seat McDonnell Douglas F/A-18C/D Hornets. A letter of intent and a 
contract were signed on the 8th of May and 5th of June, 1992, 
respectively. 
The choice of the aircraft type was based on a quality/cost ratio, the 
total performance being divided by total costs which include both 
purchase costs and life-cycle running costs. On the performance side, 
an air combat capability was the decisive factor, due to the Finnish Air 
Force's main mission as a fighter air arm. 
After a tough evaluation during which computation material was used 
extensively it must be said that all other candidates, ie. the: 
— General Dynamics F-16 
— Dassault-Breguet Mirage 2000-5 
— Saab 39 Gripen, and 
— Mikoyan MiG-29 
were good and capable fighters. Without going into confidential details 
it can be stated that, for example, the F-16 and the MiG-29 both possess 
really good flight performance, while electronics and system solutions 
employed in the Mirage and the Gripen are quite nice. All in all, 
however, the F/A-18 covered the whole spectrum in a winning way, 
and its quality/cost ratio was clearly superior. Also, the F/A-18's growth 
potential was the best from the Finnish Air Force's standpoint. The age 
of the design is optimal, and taking into consideration the development 
potential of the entire user family and the interest of the type's main 
user, the F/A-18 offers the best up-to-date programme opportunity 
with smallest costs during a long life-cycle. 
A wide industrial base of the McDonnell Douglas company gives a 
proper mix for many sorts of offset programmes. 
The motto of the Finnish Air Force is Qualitas Potentia Nostra. Taking 
into account the decisive strategic importance that an ability to control 
an airspace has these days, and future security policy, air defence is the 
first and the most critical factor in the building-up of a pre-emptive 
capability. With the new F/A-18 system the Finnish Air Force can fulfil 
its main mission, which is to keep Finland's airspace outside any crisis, 
literally according to its motto. 
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